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Quantum key distribution allows remote parties to generate information-theoretic secure keys.
The bottleneck throttling its real-life applications lies in the limited communication distance and key
generation speed, due to the fact that the information carrier can be easily lost in the channel. For
all the current implementations, the key rate is bounded by the channel transmission probability η.
Rather surprisingly, by matching the phases of two coherent states and encoding the key information
into the common phase, this linear key-rate constraint can be overcome—the secure key rate scales
with the square root of the transmission probability, O(
√
η), as proposed in twin-field quantum key
distribution [Nature (London) 557, 400 (2018)]. To achieve this, we develop an optical-mode-based
security proof that is different from the conventional qubit-based security proofs. Furthermore, the
proposed scheme is measurement device independent, i.e., it is immune to all possible detection
attacks. The simulation result shows that the key rate can even exceed the transmission probability
η between two communication parties. In addition, we apply phase postcompensation to devise a
practical version of the scheme without phase locking, which makes the proposed scheme feasible
with the current technology. This means that quantum key distribution can enjoy both sides of the
world—practicality and security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] is the most
successful application in quantum information science,
whose security was proved at the end of the last century
[3–5]. Since then, there has been a tremendous interest
in developing this quantum technology for real-life ap-
plications, starting from the first 32-cm demonstration
in the early 1990s [6] to the recent satellite QKD over
1200 km [7]. In these implementations, photons are used
as information carriers, owing to their fast transmission
speed and robustness against decoherence from the en-
vironment. Also, optical quantum communication can
be easily integrated with the current telecommunication
network infrastructure.
Now, the transmission loss of photons has become a
major obstacle in practical implementations. The quan-
tum channel transmission efficiency is characterized by
the transmittance η, defined as the probability of a pho-
ton being successfully transmitted through the channel
and being detected. For most of the current implemented
schemes, such as the well-known Bennet-Brassard 1984
(BB84) protocol [1], single-photon sources[8] are em-
ployed for key information encoding. Since the photon
carries the quantum information, when it is lost in the
channel, no secure key can be distributed. Thus, the
transmittance η becomes a natural upper bound of the
key generation rate. A more strict derivation shows a
linear key-rate bound with respect to the transmittance
[9–11], R ≤ O(η). Since the transmittance η decays ex-
ponentially with the communication distance in the fiber-
based network, this linear key-rate bound severely limits
the key generation rate.
∗ xma@tsinghua.edu.cn
The following two approaches to overcome this rate
limit have been considered: quantum repeaters [12–
14] and trusted relays. Unfortunately, using quan-
tum repeater schemes with current technology is infea-
sible because they require high-quality quantum mem-
ory and complicated local entanglement distillation op-
erations. The trusted-relay approach, however, re-
lies on the assumption that the quantum relays be-
tween two users are trustworthy, which is difficult to
ensure or verify practically; this severely undermines
the primary goal of QKD, i.e., security. In 2012, the
measurement-device-independent quantum key distribu-
tion (MDI-QKD) scheme was proposed to close all the
detection loopholes [15], which enhances the security of
a practical QKD system. Nevertheless, the key rate of the
MDI-QKD scheme is still bounded by O(η). Therefore,
the linear key-rate bound [10, 11] was widely believed to
hold for practical QKD systems without relays.
Significant efforts have been devoted to improve the
key rate by proposing different schemes. Recently, Lu-
camarini et al. proposed a novel phase-encoding QKD
protocol, called twin-field quantum key distribution (TF-
QKD) [16], which shows the possibility to overcome the
key-rate limit and make a quadratic improvement over
phase-encoding MDI-QKD [17]. In both schemes, single-
photon detection is used, whereas coincident detection
is required in other MDI-QKD schemes [15, 18]. From
technical point of view, the single-photon detection is
the key reason for the quadratic improvement. Unfor-
tunately, a rigorous security proof is still missing at the
moment. In fact, as shown later, the widely used photon
number channel model [19] used in the security proof of
MDI-QKD is proven to be invalid for this kind of setting.
Following the TF-QKD scheme [16], we investigate
phase-encoding MDI-QKD schemes with single detection
[17] and propose a phase-matching quantum key distri-
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2bution (PM-QKD) scheme that can surpass the linear
key-rate bound, inspired by the relative-phase-encoding
Bennett-1992 [20], phase-encoding MDI-QKD [17, 18],
and passive differential-phase-shift QKD [21]. The two
communication parties prepare two coherent states inde-
pendently, encode the key information onto the common
phase, and match phases via interference detection at an
untrusted measurement site. Details are given in Sec.
II. By developing an optical-mode-based security proof,
we show that the key rate of the proposed scheme scales
with the square root of the transmittance, R = O(
√
η),
in Sec. III with technical details given in Appendix A.
Also, the proposed phase-matching scheme falls into the
MDI framework, which is immune to all possible detec-
tion attacks. Our security proof can be directly applied
to TF-QKD. In Sec. IV, we deal with related practical is-
sues and develop a phase postcompensation technique to
ease the experimental requirements. In Sec. V, we simu-
late the key-rate performance of PM-QKD and compare
it to former QKD protocols, with all the practical fac-
tors taken into account. Finally, in Sec. VI, we discuss
possible future work directions.
II. PM-QKD PROTOCOL
In PM-QKD, the two communication parties, Alice
and Bob, generate coherent state pulses independently.
For a d-phase PM-QKD protocol, Alice and Bob encode
their key information κa, κb ∈ {0, 1, . . . , d − 1}, into the
phases of the coherent states, respectively, and send them
to an untrusted measurement site that could be con-
trolled by Eve, as shown in Fig. 1(a). Eve is expected
to perform interference detection. Define a successful de-
tection as the case where one and only one of the two
detectors clicks, denoted by L click and R click. This in-
terference measurement would match the phases of Alice
and Bob’s signals. Conditioned on Eve’s announcement,
Alice and Bob’s key information is correlated.
In this work, we mainly focus on PM-QKD with d = 2
and phase randomization. That is, Alice and Bob add
extra random phases on their coherent state pulses be-
fore sending these pulses to Eve. After Eve’s announce-
ment, Alice and Bob announce the extra random phases
and postselect the signals based on the random phases.
This PM-QKD scheme is detailed below and shown in
Fig. 1(b). For simplicity, by using the name “PM-QKD”
in the text below, we refer to the case of d = 2 plus phase
randomization.
State preparation: Alice randomly generates a
key bit κa and a random phase φa ∈ [0, 2pi) and
then prepares the coherent state |√µaei(φa+piκa)〉A.
Similarly, Bob generates κb and φb ∈ [0, 2pi) and
then prepares |√µbei(φb+piκb)〉B .
Measurement: Alice and Bob send their optical
pulses, A and B, to an untrusted party, Eve, who is
expected to perform an interference measurement
and record the detector (L or R) that clicks.
Announcement: Eve announces her detection re-
sults. Then, Alice and Bob announce the random
phases φa and φb, respectively.
Sifting: Alice and Bob repeat the above steps
many times. When Eve announces a successful de-
tection, (a click from exactly one of the detectors L
or R), Alice and Bob keep κa and κb as their raw
key bits. Bob flips his key bit κb if Eve’s announce-
ment was an R click. Then, Alice and Bob keep
their raw key bit only if |φa − φb| = 0 or pi. Bob
flips his key bit κb if |φa − φb| = pi.
Parameter estimation: For all the raw data that
they have retained, Alice and Bob analyze the gains
Qµ and quantum bit error rates E
Z
µ . They then
estimate EXµ using Eq. (2).
Key distillation: Alice and Bob perform error
correction and privacy amplification on the sifted
key bits to generate a private key.
Notations: Denote a coherent state in mode A to
be |√µeiφ〉
A
, where µ is the intensity and φ is the
phase; µa = µb = µ/2; Alice’s (Bob’s) key bit
κa(b) ∈ {0, 1}; total gain Qµ; phase error rate EXµ ;
and bit error rate EZµ .
The above implementation of the PM-QKD protocol
clearly resembles the phase-encoding MDI-QKD protocol
[17, 18], where the key bits are encoded in the relative
phase of two coherent pulses (the reference and signal
pulses). However, in the PM-QKD protocol, the refer-
ence pulse can be regarded as being shared by Alice and
Bob. Therefore, they no longer need to send the ref-
erence pulse, and the key becomes the global phase of
the coherent signal pulses. Another significant difference
between PM-QKD and the former phase-encoding MDI-
QKD scheme is that no basis switching is required. In
this respect, it resembles the Bennett-1992 [20] and pas-
sive DPS [21] QKD protocols. Note that, a similar pro-
posal named “MDI-B92” protocol has been proposed by
Ferenczi in 2013 [22]. With the decoy-state method, the
quantum part of PM-QKD would be similar to that of
the TF-QKD protocol without basis sifting.
III. SECURITY OF PM-QKD
To provide an intuitive understanding of the manner
in which PM-QKD works, we demonstrate its security
by considering an equivalent scenario shown in Fig. 1(c).
Here, a trusted party (Charlie) prepares a pure state
|Ψ〉C , splits it using a 50–50 beam splitter, and sends
it to Alice and Bob separately. Alice and Bob encode
their key information κa and κb into systems A and B
by modulating the phases, and then they send these to
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FIG. 1. (a) Schematic diagram of PM-QKD. Alice generates
a coherent state, |√µae2piiκa/d〉, where κa ∈ {0, 1, . . . , d− 1}.
Similarly, Bob generates |√µbe2piiκb/d〉. Alice and Bob send
the two coherent states which interfere at an untrusted mea-
surement site. (b) Schematic diagram of PM-QKD with d = 2
plus phase randomization. Alice prepares |√µaei(φa+piκa)〉
and Bob prepares |√µbei(φb+piκb)〉. The two coherent states
interfere at an untrusted measurement site. If the phase dif-
ference |(φa +piκa)− (φb +piκb)| is 0, detector L clicks; if the
phase difference is pi, detector R clicks. After Eve announces
her measurement result, Alice and Bob publicly announce φa
and φb. (c) Equivalent scenario for the postselected signals
with φa = φb. A trusted party (Charlie) prepares |Ψ〉C , splits
it and sends it to both Alice and Bob. Without loss of general-
ity, we consider the case where Alice and Bob both modulate
this by the same phase 0 or pi to create the systems A and
B. If |Ψ〉C only contains odd- or even-photon number com-
ponents, we can see that |Ψ0〉 = |Ψpi〉.
Eve who is supposed to tell whether |κa − κb| = 0 or 1.
Thus, the four possible output states that could be sent
to Eve can be expressed as |Ψ0,0〉, |Ψ0,pi〉, |Ψpi,0〉, and
|Ψpi,pi〉.
Without the loss of generality, we consider the follow-
ing case in which both encoded key bits are the same,
κa = κb. Eve attempts to learn the key bit κa(b) from
the state sent to her, which is either |Ψ0,0〉 or |Ψpi,pi〉.
Here, the phase, controlled by κa and κb and modulated
into A and B, has become the “global phase” of the com-
bined system A and B. If |Ψ〉C is a Fock state |k〉C with
k photons, then |Ψ0,0〉 = |Ψpi,pi〉, since the global phases
of Fock states are meaningless. In this case, Eve cannot
tell in principle whether the modulated phases are 0 or
pi and can only learn that κa = κb.
In our PM-QKD protocol, both Alice and Bob
transmit weak coherent pulses, |√µaei(φa+piκa)〉A and
|√µbei(φb+piκb)〉B to Eve. The phase sifting condition
φa = φb = φ is equivalent to imagining that Charlie em-
ploys a source state of |Ψ〉C = |
√
µeiφ〉
C
in Fig. 1(b). For
a phase-randomized state |√µeiφ〉
C
, it is equivalent for
Charlie to prepare a Fock state |Ψ〉C = |k〉C with a prob-
ability of P (k) = e−µµk/k!. Thus, the PM-QKD protocol
is secure if Eve cannot learn the phase φ. However, in
the real PM-QKD protocol, the phase φ will eventually
be announced during the sifting process. When this hap-
pens, Charlie’s source |Ψ〉C can no longer be regarded
as combinations of different photon-number states |k〉C .
The key challenge of the security proof of PM-QKD lies
in the fact that the quantum source cannot be regarded
as a mixture of photon number states, after Alice and
Bob announce the phases, φa and φb. That is, the pho-
ton number channel model [19] and the “tagging” method
used in the security proof by Gottesman et al. [23] (we
will refer it as GLLP security proof) can no longer be
applied. In Appendix C, a beam-splitting attack is pro-
posed to show that the GLLP formula is incorrect after
the phase announcement. Therefore, one cannot simply
reduce a randomized-phase coherent state protocol to a
single-photon-based protocol.
Our security proof of PM-QKD is based on an-
alyzing the distillable entanglement of its equivalent
entanglement-based protocol. Following the Shor-
Preskill security argument [5], the key rate of PM-QKD
protocol (for the sifted signals) is given by
rPM ≥ 1−H(EZµ )−H(EXµ ), (1)
where EZµ is the quantum bit error rate (QBER) that
can be directly estimated in the experiment; EXµ is the
phase error rate, which reflects the information leakage;
and H(x) = −x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1− x) is the binary
Shannon entropy function. We demonstrate in Appendix
A that EXµ can be bounded by
EXµ ≤ eZ0 q0 +
∞∑
k=0
eZ2k+1q2k+1 + (1− q0 −
∞∑
k=0
q2k+1).
(2)
Here, qk is the estimated ratio of the “k-photon signal”
to the full detected signal:
qk =
(e−µµk/k!)Yk
Qµ
, (3)
where Qµ is the total gain of the pulses, and Yk and e
Z
k
are the yield and bit error rate, respectively, if Char-
lie’s light source is a k-photon number state. Alice and
Bob can estimate the yield and bit error rate via the
decoy-state method [24–26]. Note that the parameters
4Yk and e
Z
k can still be used to characterize Eve’s behav-
ior even though the source is not actually a combination
of photon-number states.
Unlike most of the existing security analysis of discrete-
variable QKD, our analysis is not single-qubit based. For
a long time, the sources in QKD implementations, such
as weak coherent sources and spontaneous parametric
down-conversion sources, have been fabricated as an ap-
proximation of single qubit, following the BB84 proto-
col [1]. Here, we show the security of PM-QKD with a
coherent light source by directly applying the Lo-Chau
entanglement distillation argument [4] on analyzing the
optical modes. This technique could be helpful for both
a new QKD scheme design and security analysis.
In the equivalent scenario considered above, shown in
Fig. 1(b), a trusted party Charlie is introduced. We need
to emphasize that the virtual Charlie will be removed
in the real implementation in Sec. IV. If Charlie does
exist, Eve may inject some probes after Charlie’s out-
puts, and then she measures them at the output of Al-
ice and Bob to learn their operations. This is the main
problem of detection-device-independent QKD [27, 28].
In the PM-QKD protocol shown in Fig. 1(a), Alice and
Bob can simply isolate their light source and modulators
in an optical circulator to prevent such Trojan-horse-
like attacks. Hence, the PM-QKD scheme, like other
MDI-QKD schemes, is secure against Trojan-horse-like
attacks.
IV. PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION
Now we address a few practical issues. In the protocol
shown in Fig. 1, Alice and Bob only retain their signals
when their announced phases, φa and φb are either ex-
actly the same or with a pi difference. However, since the
announced phases are continuous, the successful sifting
probability tends to zero. Moreover, we assume that Al-
ice’s and Bob’s laser sources are perfectly locked, such
that their phase references meet, but it is very challeng-
ing in practice to achieve such phase locking.
To address these practical issues, we employ a phase
postcompensation method [18], where Alice and Bob first
divide the phase interval [0, 2pi) into M slices {∆j} for
0 ≤ j ≤ M − 1, where ∆j = [2pij/M, 2pi(j + 1)/M). In-
stead of comparing the exact phases, Alice and Bob only
compare the slice indexes. This makes the phase-sifting
step practical, but introduces an intrinsic misalignment
error. Also, Alice and Bob do not perform the phase-
sifting immediately in each round, and instead, they do
it in data postprocessing. In the parameter estimation
step, they perform the following procedures, as shown in
Fig. 2.
1. For each bit, Alice announces the phase slice index
ja and randomly samples a certain amount of key
bits and announces them for QBER testing.
2. In the phase postcompensation method, given an
offset compensation jd ∈ {0, 1, ...,M/2 − 1}, Bob
sifts the sampled bits with the phase sifting condi-
tion |jb+jd−ja| mod M = 0 or M/2. For the case
of M/2, Bob flips the key bit κb. After sifting, Bob
calculates the QBER EZ with Alice’s sampling key
bits. Bob tries all possible jd ∈ {0, 1, · · · ,M − 1},
and figures out the proper jd to minimize the sam-
pling QBER. Using the phase sifting condition with
the proper jd, Bob sifts (and flips if needed) the un-
sampled bits and announces the locations to Alice.
Alice sifts her key bits accordingly.
3. Alice and Bob analyze the overall gain Qµi and
QBER EZµi for different values of intensities µa =
µb = µi/2. They estimate the phase error rate E
(X)
µ
by Eq. (2).
Here, in the phase postcompensation step, Bob does
not need to fix a jd for the whole experiment. Bob can
group the raw data into data blocks, and then he is able
to adjust the offset jd for different data blocks. Alter-
natively, Bob can also adjust jd in real time based on
a prediction via data-fitting samples nearby. A detailed
description of the operations and security arguments is
presented in Appendix A 6. We emphasize that the fluc-
tuation of phases will only introduce additional bit errors,
but not affect the security.
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FIG. 2. Phase postcompensation. Without loss of general-
ity, here we consider the case κa = κb. Denote the phase
references of Alice and Bob as φa0 and φb0, and hence the ref-
erence deviation is φ0 = φb0 − φa0 mod 2pi. Bob can figure
out the proper phase compensation offset jd by minimizing
the QBER from random sampling as follows. Bob sets up a
jd, sifts the bits by |jb+jd−ja| = 0, and evaluates the sample
QBER. He tries all possible jd ∈ {0, 1, · · · ,M−1} and figures
out the proper jd to minimize the sample QBER. Then, he
announces the sifted locations of unsampled bits to Alice. As
shown in the figure, we set M = 12, and the reference devi-
ation φ0 = 70
◦; hence Bob can set jd = 2 to compensate the
effect of φ0.
An alternative method to phase postcompensation is
5that, Alice and Bob can generate strong pulses indepen-
dent of quantum signals for phase calibration. The two
pulses interfere at the measurement site so that Alice
and Bob can identify the phase fluctuations between two
channels. Note that the strong pulses can be set in an
optical mode slightly deviated from the quantum signals
to reduce cross-talks. According to the phase difference
measured from the strong calibration pulses, Alice and
Bob can estimate the offset jd accurately. This is a feasi-
ble way to replace the phase postcompensation method.
The main difference of this phase calibration method
from the usual phase-locking method [29] is that, no ac-
tive feedback is required. Alice and Bob learn the phase
difference only for phase sifting in data postprocessing.
Note that similar ideas of phase postcompensation
and phase calibration have already been adopted in
some continuous-variable QKD protocols, such as the
Gaussian-modulated coherent-state protocol [30, 31] and
the self-referenced protocol [32].
Another important issue is how Alice and Bob set ran-
dom phases φa, φb. In practice, it would be experimen-
tally challenging to continuously set an accurate phase to
a coherent state. As discussed above, they only need to
set the slice indexes ja, jb instead of exactly modulating
phases. There are two methods to achieve this.
• Alice and Bob first generate strong laser pulses with
(unknown) randomized phases, either by turning
on/off the lasers or active phase randomization.
They then split the pulses and apply homodyne
detection on one beam to measure the phase φa, φb
accurately enough to determine the slice indexes
ja, jb. They use the rest beam for further quantum
encoding.
• Alice and Bob first generate pulses with stable
phases. Then, they actively randomize the phase
using phase modulators. Alice and Bob can record
the corresponding random numbers as for slice in-
dexes ja, jb. Note that the phase randomization can
be discrete, which has been proven to be secure and
efficient with a few discrete phases [33].
In order to optimize the estimated phase slice shift jd
for minimizing the bit error rate, the phase compensation
or calibration should be resettled with respect to phase
drift. In practice, there are two major factors which
may cause phase drift. One is the laser linewidth ∆ν,
which causes a dispersion effect on the output pulse. The
phase varies randomly with respect to the coherent time
Tcoh ≈ (∆ν)−1. To alleviate the dispersion, a CW laser
source with a long coherence time should be employed.
The other major factor for phase drift is the variation of
optical path length ∆L. In a recent work of TF-QKD
[16], Lucamarini et al. experimentally tested the phase
drift in a MDI setting. The results show that the phase
drift follows a Gaussian distribution with zero mean and
a standard deviation of about 6.0 rad ms−1 for a total
distance of 550 km. To enhance the performance of PM-
QKD protocol, former works on phase stabilization of
optical fibers [34–36] can be employed.
With all the practical factors taken into account, the
final key-rate formula can be expressed as
RPM ≥ 2
M
Qµ[−fH(Eµ) + 1−H(EXµ )], (4)
where the phase error rate EXµ is given by Eq. (2), 2/M is
the sifting factor and f is the error correction efficiency.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
We simulate the performance of PM-QKD with the
parameters given in Fig. 3(b), assuming a lossy channel
that is symmetrical for Alice and Bob. The dark count
rate pd is from Ref. [37], and the other parameters are
set to be typical values. The simulation formulas for
Qµ, E
Z
µ and E
X
µ of PM-QKD are given in Eqs. (B14),
(B22), and (B27), respectively, in Appendix B 2. The
simulation formulas for BB84 and MDI-QKD are listed
in Appendix B 3.
The simulation results are shown in Fig. 3(a). From
the figure, one can see that PM-QKD is able to exceed
the linear key-rate bound when l > 250 km with practical
settings such as dark counts, misalignment errors, and
sifting factors. Compared with MDI-QKD, PM-QKD can
achieve a longer transmission distance of l = 450 km and
the key rate is increased by approximatedly 4 ∼ 6 orders
of magnitude when l > 300 km. Moreover, if we set up a
cutoff line of key rate R = 10−8 as real-life consideration,
then the longest practical transmission distance of PM-
QKD is over 400 km, whereas the ones of BB84 and MDI-
QKD are all lower than 250 km.
Several QKD schemes are compared in Fig. 3(c). The
comparison shows that the PM-QKD scheme outper-
forms the existing protocols in the following aspects.
First, the PM-QKD scheme has a quadratic improvement
of key rate, O(
√
η). In the security aspect, PM-QKD en-
joys the measurement-device-independent nature that is
immune to all detection attacks. In the practical aspect,
it removes the requirement of the basis switch, which
can simplify the experiment apparatus and reduce the
randomness consumption.
Here, we would like to clarify that the linear key-rate
bound by Pirandola et al. [11] is derived for point-to-
point QKD protocols. In the PM-QKD or other MDI-
QKD schemes, there is an untrusted relay held by Eve.
The quadratic improvement in PM-QKD seems unsur-
prising if we regard the untrusted middle node as a quan-
tum repeater.
Note that the security of recently proposed TF-QKD
protocol [16] can be reduced to the security of PM-QKD
protocol if the information for the two bases X, Y is
ignored in TF-QKD It remains an open problem whether
we can reach a higher key rate by taking advantage of the
basis information together.
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Dark count rate pd 8× 10−8
Error correction efficiency f 1.15
Detector efficiency ηd 14.5%
Number of phase slices M 16
Misalignment error ed 1.5%
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Key rate O(
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FIG. 3. (a) Simulation of our PM-QKD protocol. For the considered simulation parameters, the key rate of PM-QKD surpasses
that of the conventional BB84 protocol when l > 120 km and it exceeds the linear key-rate bound by Pirandola et al. [11]
when l > 250 km. In addition, our protocol is also able to achieve a long transmission distance of l = 418 km. (b) Parameters
used for simulation. (c) Comparison of different QKD protocols: PM-QKD; TF-QKD [16]; MDI-QKD [15]; passive differential
phase-shift (DPS) QKD [21]; Bennett-1992 (B92) QKD [20]. Key rate: dependence of the key rate on the channel transmittance
η; Detection loophole: whether the protocol is immune to all detection loopholes; Qubit based: whether the security analysis
is based on the single-qubit case; Basis switch: whether the source (measurement device) must prepare (measure) states in
complementary bases; Phase locking: whether the protocol requires a fixed phase reference frame for the two users. *Our
security proof and performance analysis apply to TF-QKD if the basis information X, Y is ignored.
VI. OUTLOOK
There are a few interesting directions on PM-QKD.
First, it is interesting to work out the security of the
general d-phase PM-QKD protocol shown in Fig. 1(a)
with and without phase randomization. Meanwhile, in
the above discussions, PM-QKD in Fig. 1(b) is treated
as a single-basis scheme with phase randomization. In a
dual viewpoint, we can regard the different global phases
φa, φb as different bases and naturally treat the phase-
sifting step as basis-sifting. This is interesting, since it
shows the advantage of QKD using multi-nonorthogonal
bases. Moreover, this multibases view may help us to
generalize the phase-matching scheme to, for example, a
polarization-based one.
Second, the phase-sifting factor 2/M is very small,
which undermines the advantage of PM-QKD for near-
distance (i.e., l < 120 km) communication. One possible
solution is to apply a biased phase randomization; i.e.,
the φa(b) is not uniformly randomized in [0, 2pi).
Third, we bound the total phase error EXµ by pes-
simistically considering the phase errors eXk for even pho-
ton number components to be 1 in Eq. (A33), as shown
in Appendix A 5. There may be a scope to improve the
bound of total phase error EXµ . For example, the two-
photon error eZ2 and e
X
2 can be better estimated with
more decoy states, which leads to a tighter bounds of
EXµ .
Finally, since we can overcome the key-rate linear
bound, it is interesting to investigate a repeaterless se-
cret key capacity bound for QKD, for example, whether
it is possible to push the key rate to R = O(η1/3)
or O(η1/4) without repeaters. Note that the key-rate
bound has been derived for the single-repeater case [38],
− log(1 − √η), which is close to √η when η is small.
So far, our key rate, Eq. (4), is still far away from this
bound. It is an interesting direction to improve the PM-
QKD protocol to approach this bound.
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Appendix A: Security Proof of PM-QKD
In this section, we provide a security proof for the PM-
QKD protocol with d = 2 via entanglement distillation
[39]. Note that the existing security proofs of discrete-
variable QKD assume qubit (or qudit) states transmitted
through the channel. Here, we develop a new security
proof by exploring continuous optical modes directly.
The organization of the proof is presented as follows.
First, we briefly review the main results of the Lo-Chau
7[4] and Shor-Preskill [5] security proofs in Appendix A 1.
Then, we provide a virtual entanglement-based protocol
(Protocol I) in Appendix A 2 and present a key result
as Lemma 1. In Appendix A 3, we employ a few equiva-
lency arguments, and eventually, we prove the security of
PM-QKD in Appendix A 4. In Appendix A 5, we employ
the decoy-state method to give tight bounds on phase er-
ror rates. In Appendix A 6, we solve the phase-reference
issue with the phase postcompensation technique.
Here, we introduce some definitions and notations for
later discussions. For an optical mode A, whose creation
operator is a†, its Hilbert space is denoted as HA. Let
D(HA) denote the space of density operators acting on
HA and L(HA) denote the space of linear operators act-
ing on HA. A Fock state |k〉A with k photons in mode A
is defined as
|k〉A ≡
(a†)k√
k!
|0〉A , (A1)
where |0〉A is the vacuum state. A coherent state |α〉A is
defined as
|α〉A ≡ e−
1
2 |α|2
∞∑
k=0
αk√
k!
|k〉A
= e−
1
2 |α|2
∞∑
k=0
(αa†)k
k!
|0〉A
= e−
1
2 |α|2eαa
† |0〉A .
(A2)
The photon number of |α〉A follows a Poisson distribu-
tion,
P (k) = e−µ
µk
k!
, (A3)
where µ = |α|2 is the mean photon number or the light
intensity.
Define the odd subspace HAodd ⊆ HA which is spanned
by the odd Fock states {|k〉A}, where all the photon
numbers k are odd. Similarly, define the even sub-
space HAeven ⊆ HA, where the photon numbers are even.
Name a state ρ ∈ D(HAodd) to be the odd state and a
state ρ ∈ D(HAeven) to be even state. Name a state
ρ ∈ D(HAodd) or ρ ∈ D(HAeven) to be parity state. De-
note
|αodd〉A ≡
1
2
√
codd
(|α〉A − |−α〉A)
=
1√
codd
e−
1
2 |α|2
∞∑
k=0
(α)2k+1√
(2k + 1)!
|2k + 1〉A ,
|αeven〉A ≡
1
2
√
ceven
(|α〉A + |−α〉A)
=
1√
ceven
e−
1
2 |α|2
∞∑
k=0
(α)2k√
(2k)!
|2k〉A ,
(A4)
where
codd = e
−µ
∞∑
k=0
µ2k+1
(2k + 1)!
= e−µ sinhµ,
ceven = e
−µ
∞∑
k=0
µ2k
(2k)!
= e−µ coshµ,
(A5)
are the normalization factors with codd + ceven = 1, and
µ = |α|2 is the light intensity. It is not hard to see that
|αodd〉A ∈ HAodd and |αeven〉A ∈ HAeven.
Denote the photon number measurement {Mk}k as
Mk ≡ |k〉A 〈k| . (A6)
Denote the parity measurement {Modd,Meven} as
Modd ≡
∞∑
k=0
|2k + 1〉A 〈2k + 1| ,
Meven ≡
∞∑
k=0
|2k〉A 〈2k| .
(A7)
For a beam splitter (BS), we express the input optical
modes as A,B, with creation operators a†, b†, respec-
tively, and the output optical modes as C,D, with cre-
ation operators c†, d†, respectively. The BS transforms
modes A and B to C and D according to(
c†
d†
)
=
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)(
a†
b†
)
. (A8)
For a qubit system A′, the Hilbert space is denoted
by HA′ . The Pauli operators on HA′ are denoted as
XA′ , YA′ and ZA′ . The eigenstates of XA′ , YA′ and ZA′
are denoted by {|±〉A′}; {|±i〉A′} and {|0〉A′ , |1〉A′}, re-
spectively. The X-basis measurement is denoted by
MX : {|+〉A′ 〈+| , |−〉A′ 〈−|}. The Z-basis measurement
is denoted by MZ : {|0〉A′ 〈0| , |1〉A′ 〈1|}.
A control-phase gate, Cpi, from a qubit A
′ to an optical
mode A, is defined as
Cpi ≡ |0〉A′ 〈0| ⊗ UA(0) + |1〉A′ 〈1| ⊗ UA(pi), (A9)
where UA(φ) ≡ eiφa†a is a φ-phase shifter operation on
the mode A.
Definition 1. Two QKD protocols are equivalent if the
following criteria are satisfied:
1. The quantum states transmitted in the channel are
the same.
2. All announced classical information is the same.
3. Alice and Bob perform the same measurement on
the same quantum states to obtain the raw key bits.
4. Alice and Bob use the same postprocessing to ex-
tract secure key bits.
Obviously, equivalent QKD protocols will lead to iden-
tical key rates.
81. Security proof via entanglement distillation
Here, we briefly review the security proof based on
entanglement distillation [4, 5]. Suppose that in QKD,
Alice generates an l-bit key string S, and Bob generates
an estimate of the key string S′. Denote the space of S
as S, whose dimension is 2l. An adversary Eve attempts
to learn about S from the information leakage.
After QKD, Alice and Bob should share the same key
privately. A key S is called “correct”, if S′ = S for any
strategy of Eve, and is called “cor-correct”, if
Pr[S′ 6= S] ≤ cor. (A10)
To define a private key, consider the quantum state ρAE
that describes the correlation between Alice’s classical
key S and Eve’s system E (for any attacks). A key S is
called “sec-private” from E if [40, 41]
min
σE
1
2
||ρAE − ωA ⊗ σE ||1 ≤ sec, (A11)
where ωA = (|S|)−1
∑|S|−1
S=0 |S〉A 〈S| is the equally mixed
key state over all possible keys in space S and || · ||1 is
the trace norm. A QKD protocol is called “secure” if the
generated key is both correct and private. It is called
“-secure” if the generated key is cor-correct and sec-
private with  = cor + sec.
Here, we consider the case where Alice and Bob share
an m-pair-of-qubits gigantic state ρ
(m)
A′B′ . If we can show
that
F (ρ
(m)
A′B′ , |Φ+〉
(m)
A′B′) ≥
√
1− 2l (A12)
where |Φ+〉(m)A′B′ is the state of m perfect EPR pairs
|Φ+〉 = (|00〉 + |11〉)/√2, and 0 ≤ l ≤ 1, then it can
be shown that it is l-private and l-correct, and then it
is 2l-secure. That is, to show the security of a QKD
protocol, we only need to show that the state for key ex-
traction ρ
(m)
A′B′ is close to the perfect EPR pairs |Φ+〉(m)A′B′ .
Here is the intuition of the Lo-Chau security proof [4].
Suppose Alice and Bob share an n-pair-of-qubit gigantic
state ρ
(n)
A′B′ at the beginning. If they perform an effi-
cient entanglement distillation protocol (EDP) to distill
m EPR pairs, then they will be able to share nearly m
bit correct and private keys. Now the task becomes how
to find the right EDP.
Bennett, DiVincenzo, Smolin, and Wootters (BDSW)
show that [39], if an n-pair-of-qubit state ρ
(n)
A′B′ can be
written as a classical mixture of Bell state products,
ρ
(n)
A′B′ =
∑
b1,b2,...,bn
pb1,b2,...,bn |b1, b2, ..., bn〉 〈b1, b2, ..., bn| ,
|b1, b2, ...bn〉 =
n⊗
i=1
|Φ(i)bi 〉 ,
(A13)
where |Φ(i)bi 〉 is one of the four Bell states labeled by
bi ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} on the i th qubit, then one can distill
entanglement by employing EDPs. In the one-way hash-
ing method [39], a specific type of one-way EDP, Alice
measures a series of commuting operators based on some
random-hashing matrix on her n qubits, and she sends
the results to Bob. Bob measures the same operators
on his n qubits and infers the locations and types of the
errors from the difference in the measurement results.
After that, Alice and Bob correct the errors and obtain
m (m ≤ n, almost perfect) EPR pairs.
In general, of course, the initial state ρ
(n)
A′B′ can deviate
from Bell-diagonal states and become highly entangled
between different pairs. In the Lo-Chau security proof
[4], it has been shown that, for the one-way hashing EDP
introduced above, the error syndrome and EDP perfor-
mance of such ρ
(n)
A′B′ is the same as that of the state after
dephasing between pairs,
ρ
(n)
A′B′,dep ≡Wρ(n)A′B′W,
W =
∑
b1,b2,...,bn
|b1, b2, ..., bn〉 〈b1, b2, ..., bn| . (A14)
where |b1, b2, ..., bn〉 is defined in Eq. (A13). Therefore,
one can reduce the EDP for general ρ
(n)
A′B′ (i.e., the case
with coherent attacks) to the case in Eq. (A13).
In the Shor-Preskill security proof [5], the one-way
EDP protocol is reduced to a “prepare-and-measure”
QKD protocol, by employing the CSS code[42]. Later,
other techniques of decoupling X-error correction and
Z-error correction are introduced for this reduction. For
a one-way EDP protocol based on the CSS code, the dis-
tillation rate of EPR pairs, r ≡ limn→∞m/n, is given
by
r = 1−H(EZ)−H(EX), (A15)
where EZ and EX are the Z-error rate and X-error rate,
respectively, and H(x) = −x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1− x)
is the binary Shannon entropy function. The error rates
can defined as measurement results on ρ
(n)
A′B′ ,
EZ ≡ Tr[
n⊕
j=1
1
2
(1− Z(j)A′ ⊗ Z(j)B′ )ρ(n)A′B′ ],
EX ≡ Tr[
n⊕
j=1
1
2
(1−X(j)A′ ⊗X(j)B′ )ρ(n)A′B′ ],
(A16)
where X
(j)
A′(B′) is the Pauli X operator and Z
(j)
A′(B′) is
the Pauli Z operator, on the j th pair-of-qubits system
A′(B′). Since the bit value is measured in the Z-basis
and the phase value is measured in the X-basis, we also
call the Z-basis error the “bit error” and the X-basis
error the “phase error”.
Following the Shor-Preskill security proof, distillable
entanglement of the one-way EDP protocol is the key rate
for some prepare-and-measure QKD protocols such as
9BB84 [1]. In the BB84 protocol, we can estimate EZ , EX
by randomly measuring the qubits in the X- and Z-basis.
In the PM-QKD protocol, on the other hand, Alice and
Bob can only measure in the Z-basis. In the following
sections, we will introduce entanglement-based PM-QKD
protocols and discuss how to infer the value of EX .
2. Entanglement-based PM-QKD protocol
We first introduce an entanglement-based PM-QKD
protocol, called Protocol I, as shown in Fig. 4.
Protocol I
1. State preparation: A trusted party, Charlie, picks a
state ρ on optical mode C, splits ρ into two pulses,
A and B; and sends them to Alice and Bob, re-
spectively. Alice and Bob initialize their qubits in
|+i〉. Alice applies the control gate Cpi, defined in
Eq. (A9), to qubit A′ and optical pulse A. Simi-
larly, Bob applies Cpi to B
′ and B.
2. Measurement: The two optical pulses A and B are
sent to an untrusted party, Eve, who is supposed
to perform interference measurement and record
which detector (L or R) clicks.
3. Announcement: Eve announces the detection re-
sult, L/R click or failure, for each round.
4. Sifting: When Eve announces an L/R click, Alice
and Bob keep the qubits of systems A′ and B′. In
addition, Bob applies a Pauli Y -gate to his qubit if
Eve’s announcement is R click.
5. Parameter estimation: After many rounds of the
above steps, Alice and Bob end up with a joint 2n-
qubit state, denoted by ρ
(n)
A′B′ . They then perform
random sampling on the remaining ρ
(n)
A′B′ to esti-
mate EZ and infer EX by Eq. (A24).
6. Key distillation: Alice and Bob apply a stan-
dard EDP when the error rates are below a cer-
tain threshold. The distillation ratio r is given by
Eq. (A15). Once Alice and Bob obtain nr (almost)
pure EPR pairs, they both perform local Z mea-
surements on the qubits to generate private keys.
Our first observation is that, if the state ρ prepared
by Charlie is a parity state, namely, ρ ∈ D(HCodd) or
ρ ∈ D(HCeven), then the X-error rate and Z-error rate are
correlated. Here, we denote the Z-error rate and X-error
rate for an odd state ρodd as e
Z
odd and e
X
odd, respectively,
and similarly, denote for an even state ρeven as e
Z
even and
eXeven.
Lemma 1. In Protocol I, for ρ ∈ D(HCodd), eXodd = eZodd;
and for ρ ∈ D(HCeven), eXeven = 1− eZeven.
Proof. First consider the case when ρ is a Fock state |k〉C ,
defined in Eq. (A1). After passing through the BS, as
shown in Fig. 4, the state on modes A and B becomes
1√
2kk!
(a† + b†)k |00〉AB . (A17)
The joint state on system A′, B′, A,B before the Cpi op-
erations is
1√
2kk!
|+i+ i〉A′B′ (a† + b†)k |00〉AB
=
1√
2kk!
1
2
[(|00〉 − |11〉) + i(|01〉+ |10〉)]A′B′(a† + b†)k |00〉AB .
(A18)
After the Cpi operations, this state becomes
|Ψ(k)0 〉 =

1
2
√
2kk!
[(|00〉+ |11〉)A′B′(a† + b†)k |00〉AB + i(|01〉 − |10〉)A′B′(a† − b†)k |00〉AB ],
if k is odd,
1
2
√
2kk!
[(|00〉 − |11〉)A′B′(a† + b†)k |00〉AB + i(|01〉+ |10〉)A′B′(a† − b†)k |00〉AB ],
if k is even.
(A19)
As shown in Fig. 4(b), the X-basis measurement on
A′ or B′ is realized by a Hadamard gate followed by
the Z-basis measurement. Denote the state after local
Hadamard gates as |Ψ(k)HH〉 ≡ (HA
′ ⊗HB′) |Ψ(k)0 〉; then,
|Ψ(k)HH〉 =

1
2
√
2kk!
[(|00〉+ |11〉)A′B′(a† + b†)k |00〉AB + i(|01〉 − |10〉)A′B′(a† − b†)k |00〉AB ],
if k is odd,
1
2
√
2kk!
[(|01〉+ |10〉)A′B′(a† + b†)k |00〉AB + i(|00〉 − |11〉)A′B′(a† − b†)k |00〉AB ],
if k is even.
(A20)
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FIG. 4. (a) Schematic diagram of Protocol I. (b) Equivalent view of Protocol I, where the X-basis measurement on A′ or B′
is realized by a Hadamard gate followed by the Z-basis measurement.
In other words, the X-error rate eXk can be under-
stood as the error rate by performing the Z-basis mea-
surement on the state of |Ψ(k)HH〉. The relation between
the X- and Z-error rates can be obtained by compar-
ing Eqs. (A19) and (A20). For the odd-photon-number
case, since |Ψ(2k+1)HH 〉 = |Ψ(2k+1)0 〉, we have eX2k+1 = eZ2k+1.
For the even-photon-number case, since |Ψ(2k)HH 〉 = IA
′ ⊗
Y B
′ |Ψ(2k)0 〉, we have eX2k = 1− eZ2k.
Now, let us consider the case of pure parity states.
For an odd state |ψodd〉C =
∑
c2k+1 |2k + 1〉C , where∑
k |c2k+1|2 = 1, since the BS and Cpi are unitary op-
erations, the state after these operations can be written
as
|Ψ(odd)0 〉 =
∑
k
c2k+1 |Ψ(2k+1)0 〉 . (A21)
After local Hadamard gates, the state becomes |Ψ(odd)HH 〉 ≡
(HA
′⊗HB′) |Ψ(odd)0 〉. From Eqs. (A19), (A20), (A21), we
can see that |Ψ(odd)HH 〉 = |Ψ(odd)0 〉, and hence eZodd = eXodd.
With the same argument, we have eZeven = 1− eXeven.
For general parity states, we can regard them as mix-
tures of pure parity states,
ρodd =
∑
i
pi |ψ(i)odd〉 〈ψ(i)odd| ,
ρeven =
∑
i
pi |ψ(i)even〉 〈ψ(i)even| .
(A22)
This is equivalent to Charlie sending out |ψ(i)odd(even)〉 with
probability pi. For each pure state component, we have
eXodd(i) = e
Z
odd(i) and e
X
even(i) = 1 − eZeven(i). Thus, the
relations hold for all (mixed) parity states.
In general, Charlie might not use a parity state. Con-
sider the case that Charlie performs the parity measure-
ment {Modd,Meven}, defined in Eq. (A7), before send-
ing to Alice and Bob. Denote the measurement outcome
probabilities for the odd and even parity to be podd and
peven, respectively. This is equivalent to Charlie prepar-
ing an odd state ρodd and an even state ρeven with prob-
abilities podd and peven, respectively. Then, the state can
be written as
ρ = poddρodd + pevenρeven, (A23)
that is, ρ ∈ D(HCodd ⊕HCeven).
Suppose Charlie announces the parity information
publicly to Alice and Bob. Then, they can label the sifted
qubits with “odd” and “even”. Denote qodd and qeven,
with qodd + qeven = 1, to be the fractions of odd- and
even-labeled states in the sifted n-pairs of qubit states
A′, B′, respectively. Then, according to Lemma 1, the
total X-error rate can be calculated by
EX = qodde
X
odd + qevene
X
even
= qodde
Z
odd + qeven(1− eZeven).
(A24)
Here, the parameters qodd, qeven, e
Z
odd, and e
Z
even can be
evaluated according to Charlie’s parity announcement.
When the parity information is missing, Alice and Bob
need to estimate these parameters, which will be de-
scribed later in Appendix A 5.
3. Coherent state protocol and equivalent process
From Protocol I to the PM-QKD protocol, there are a
few practical issues that need to be addressed. First, the
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trusted party Charlie and the BS should be removed. In
order to do this, we consider a special case where Charlie
prepares a coherent state |√µ〉
C
as the photon source. In
addition, Charlie adds a random phase φ ∈ {0, pi} with
equal probabilities to the coherent state, so the density
matrix can be written as
ρ(α,−α) = 1
2
(|α〉 〈α|+ |−α〉 〈−α|)
= codd |αodd〉 〈αodd|+ ceven |αeven〉 〈αeven| ,
(A25)
where α =
√
µ, and |αodd〉, |αeven〉, codd and ceven are
defined in Eqs. (A4) and Eq. (A5). Clearly, one can see
that ρ(α,−α) ∈ D(HCodd ⊕HCeven).
Now, Alice and Bob want to prepare the state given
in Eq. (A25) without Charlie’s assistance. They first lo-
cally prepare two coherent states |√µ/2〉
A(B)
and add
the same random phase φ ∈ {0, pi} to their states, as
shown in Fig. 5(b). Then, the state becomes
ρAB(
√
µ,−√µ) = 1
2
(|
√
µ/2〉A 〈
√
µ/2| ⊗ |
√
µ/2〉B 〈
√
µ/2|+ |
√
−µ/2〉A 〈
√
−µ/2| ⊗ |
√
−µ/2〉B 〈
√
−µ/2|). (A26)
Apparently, ρAB(
√
µ,−√µ) is the state after ρ(α,−α)
defined in Eq. (A25) going through the BS. Thus, this
new protocol (Protocol II) is equivalent to Protocol I with
the input state ρ(
√
µ,−√µ).
Protocol II runs as follows, as shown in Fig. 5(b). Here,
µa = µb = µ/2.
Protocol II
1. State preparation: Alice and Bob prepare coherent
states |√µa〉 and |√µb〉 on optical modes A and B,
respectively. They initialize the qubits A′ and B′ in
|+i〉. They add the same random phase φ ∈ {0, pi}
on the optical modes A and B. Alice applies the
control gate Cpi, defined in Eq. (A9), to qubit A
′
and optical pulse A. Similarly, Bob applies Cpi to
B′ and B.
2. Measurement: The two optical pulses A and B are
sent to an untrusted party, Eve, who is supposed
to perform interference measurement and record
which detector (L or R) clicks.
3. Announcement: Eve announces the detection re-
sult, L/R click or failure, for each round.
4. Sifting: When Eve announces an L/R click, Alice
and Bob keep the qubits of systems A′ and B′. In
addition, Bob applies a Pauli Y -gate to his qubit if
Eve’s announcement is an R click.
5. Parameter estimation: After many rounds of the
above steps, Alice and Bob end up with a joint 2n-
qubit state, denoted by ρ
(n)
A′B′ . They then perform
random sampling on the remaining ρ
(n)
A′B′ to esti-
mate EZ and infer EX by Eq. (A24).
6. Key distillation: Alice and Bob apply a stan-
dard EDP when the error rates are below a cer-
tain threshold. The distillation ratio r is given by
Eq. (A15). Once Alice and Bob obtain nr (almost)
pure EPR pairs, they both perform local Z mea-
surements on the qubits to generate private keys.
From Protocol II to the PM-QKD protocol, there are
still some missing links.
1. Alice and Bob need to add the same random phase
φ ∈ {0, pi} to their states, which would cost them a
private bit.
2. They use Eq. (A24) to infer EX , which needs in-
formation on the parameters of qodd, qeven, e
Z
odd and
eZeven.
3. The phase references of Alice and Bob’s coherent
states are locked. That is, the phases of the initial
coherent states, |√µa〉 and |√µb〉, are the same,
and hence remote phase locking is required.
We shall remove the simultaneous phase randomization
requirement in Appendix A 4, bound qodd, qeven, e
Z
odd and
eZeven in Appendix A 5, and remove the phase-locking re-
quirement in Appendix A 6.
4. Security with phase announcement
To remove the simultaneous phase randomization re-
quirement in Protocol II, a straightforward idea is that
Alice and Bob add random phases φa(b) ∈ {0, pi} inde-
pendently (with equal probability 1/2); during the sifting
step, they announce the phases φa, φb and postselect the
bits only for φa = φb, as shown in Fig. 6. All the other
steps remain unchanged. Here, there are two modifica-
tions that need to be analyzed, the phase announcement
of φa, φb and postselection of φa = φb.
We deal with the phase announcement of φa, φb first.
Consider Protocol IIa, as shown in Fig. 6, where Alice
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FIG. 5. (a) A specific realization of Protocol I, where Charlie prepares |√µ〉 and |√−µ〉 with equal probabilities. (b) Schematic
diagram of Protocol II, where Alice and Bob prepare |√µ/2〉 and add the same random phase φ ∈ {0, pi}.
and Bob announce the random phase φ in Protocol II
during postprocessing.
Protocol IIa
1. State preparation: Same as Protocol II.
2. Measurement: Same as Protocol II.
3. Announcement: Same as Protocol II.
4. Sifting: The first part is the same as Protocol II.
After that, Alice and Bob announce the random
phase φ.
5. Parameter estimation: Same as Protocol II.
6. Key distillation: Same as Protocol II.
Note that the only difference between Protocol II and
IIa is that Alice and Bob announce their phase φ after
Eve’s announcement. Since the classical information an-
nounced during postprocessing is different, according to
Definition 1, Protocol II and IIa are not equivalent. In
fact, from some specific attacks (see Appendix C), one
can see that the security of the two protocols with and
without phase announcement can be very different.
In Protocol II, as shown in Fig. 6, because of phase
randomization, one can always assume that Alice and
Bob (or Eve) perform the total parity measurement
{M todd,M teven}, which is defined as, similar to Eq. (A7),
M todd ≡
∑
k1+k2 is odd
|k1k2〉AB 〈k1k2| ,
M teven ≡
∑
k1+k2 is even
|k1k2〉AB 〈k1k2| .
(A27)
Here, {|k1k2〉AB} are the Fock states on mode A,B, with
k1 photons on A and k2 photons on B. That is, in Pro-
tocol II, the photon source can be regarded as a mixture
of odd states and even states. The parity-state channel
model is similar to the photon number channel used in
the security proof of the decoy-state method [19, 25].
In Protocol IIa, as shown in Fig. 6, on the other hand,
no such parity measurement is allowed because it does
not commute with the phase announcement. That is, Eve
can distinguish whether or not Alice and Bob perform
{M todd,M teven} after the announcement of phases φa and
φb. In other words, the quantum signals sent by Alice
and Bob can no longer be regarded as a mixture of ρodd
and ρeven in Protocol IIa. To analyze the security of
Protocol IIa, we notice the following observation.
Observation 1. The joint states ρ
(n)
A′B′ obtained in pro-
tocols I, II, and IIa are the same after sifting in Step
4.
Note that qubit systems A′ and B′ are local and never
sent to Eve. Before the sifting step, these qubits are
these qubits are identical and sampled independently
(i.i.d.) and the same for protocols I, II, and IIa. The
state ρ
(n)
A′B′ is postselected by Eve’s announcement. Of
course, Eve can manipulate ρ
(n)
A′B′ by different measure-
ment or announcement strategies. We emphasize that
Eve announces before the phase announcement in Proto-
col IIa. Then, her strategy cannot depend on the phase
announcement. Therefore, in all three protocols, the
state ρ
(n)
A′B′ remains the same. This is crucial to our se-
curity analysis. From Observation 1, we can have the
following Corollary.
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FIG. 6. The schematic diagram of protocols II, IIa, and III. In Protocol II, Alice and Bob add the same phase φ ∈ {0, pi} on
their coherent state
√
µ/2. In Protocol IIa, Alice and Bob announce the phase φ after Eve’s announcement. In Protocol III,
Alice and Bob add phases φa and φb, independently. They announce φa and φb after Eve’s announcement.
Corollary 1. Both the X- and Z-error patterns of the
joint states ρ
(n)
A′B′ in protocol II and IIa are the same.
Then, the X-error rates EX of protocols II and IIa are
the same, as given by Eq. (A24).
Now, we deal with the postselection of φa = φb. Re-
gardless of the values of φa, φb, because of control-phase
gates Cpi, the state ρAB sent to Eve is
ρAB = ρA(
√
µ/2,−
√
µ/2)⊗ρB(
√
µ/2,−
√
µ/2), (A28)
where ρ(
√
µ/2,−√µ/2) is defined in Eq. (A25). The
state ρAB is independent of φa, φb; hence Eve’s attack
cannot depend on φa, φb, and the sifted qubits are also
independent of the value of φa(= φb).
Furthermore, we notice that discarded qubits with
|φa − φb| = pi can also be used for entanglement distilla-
tion. Here, adding a phase pi to system B is equivalent to
performing a Pauli Y -gate to system B′ for a parity-state
source in protocols I, II and IIa. Thus, for the qubits with
|φa − φb| = pi, Bob performs Y -gate on qubit B′.
Therefore, if Alice and Bob randomize their phases
φa, φb ∈ {0, pi} independently and perform phase-sifting
operations after Eve’s announcement, shown in Fig. 6,
the modified protocol is equivalent to Protocol IIa. We
call this Protocol III, which runs as follows, as shown in
Fig. 6. Here, µa = µb = µ/2.
Protocol III
1. State preparation: Alice and Bob prepare coher-
ent states |√µa〉 and |√µb〉 on optical modes A,B,
separately. They initial their qubits A′, B′ in |+i〉.
They independently add random phases φa, φb ∈
{0, pi} on optical modes A,B. Alice applies the
control gate Cpi, defined in Eq. (A9), to qubit A
′
and optical pulse A. Similarly, Bob applies Cpi to
B′ and B.
2. Measurement: The two optical pulses, A and B, are
sent to an untrusted party, Eve, who is supposed
to perform an interference measurement and record
which detector (L or R) clicks.
3. Announcement: Eve announces the detection re-
sult, L/R click or failure, for each round.
4. Sifting: When Eve announces an L/R click, Al-
ice and Bob keep the qubits of systems A′ and B′.
Bob applies a Pauli Y -gate to his qubit if Eve’s
announcement is R click. After Eve’s announce-
ment, Alice and Bob announce their encoded phase
φa, φb. Bob applies a Pauli Y -gate to his qubit if
|φa − φb| = pi.
5. Parameter estimation: After many rounds of the
above steps, Alice and Bob end up with a joint 2n-
qubit state, denoted by ρ
(n)
A′B′ . They then perform
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random sampling on the remaining ρ
(n)
A′B′ to esti-
mate EZ and infer EX by Eq. (A24).
6. Key distillation: Alice and Bob apply a stan-
dard EDP when the error rates are below a cer-
tain threshold. The distillation ratio r is given by
Eq. (A15). Once Alice and Bob obtain nr (almost)
pure EPR pairs, they both perform local Z mea-
surements on the qubits to generate private keys.
5. Decoy-state method and phase randomization
Here, we introduce a method to estimate qodd, qeven,
eZodd and e
Z
even. Without loss of generality, we mainly
discuss the decoy-state method in Protocol I. Similar ar-
guments can be applied to protocols II, IIa, and III.
Recall that in Protocol I, if Charlie prepares coherent
state |√µ〉 and adds a random phase {0, pi} on it, it is
equivalent to preparing odd- and even-parity states with
probabilities pµodd = codd and p
µ
even = ceven, respectively,
as defined in Eq. (A5). Define the yield Y µodd (Y
µ
even) as
the probability of successful detection conditional on the
odd-parity (even-parity) state. The fraction of odd- and
even-parity states in the final detected signal is given by
qµodd = p
µ
odd
Y µodd
Qµ
,
qµeven = p
µ
even
Y µeven
Qµ
,
(A29)
where Qµ is the total gain of the signals. For signals with
intensity µ, we have
Qµ = pµoddY
µ
odd + p
µ
evenY
µ
even,
EZ,µQµ = eZ,µoddp
µ
oddY
µ
odd + e
Z,µ
evenp
µ
evenY
µ
even,
(A30)
where EZµ , e
Z,µ
add (e
Z,µ
even) are the quantum bit error rate
(QBER) and the Z-error rate of odd-state (even-state)
signals with total a intensity of µ, respectively.
If we directly estimate qµodd, q
µ
even, e
Z,µ
odd and e
Z,µ
even from
Eq. (A29), Eq. (A30), and the constriant that
qµodd, q
µ
even, e
Z,µ
odd , e
Z,µ
even, Y
µ
odd, Y
µ
even ∈ [0, 1], (A31)
then the estimation is too loose to bound the X-error
EX in Eq. (A24).
Now, we introduce a more efficient method to estimate
qodd, qeven, e
Z
odd and e
Z
even. Essentially, we employ the
idea of the decoy-state method [25]. That is, in Protocol
I, Charlie adjusts the intensity µ of his prepared coherent
lights. After Eve’s announcement, Charlie announces the
value of µ. Furthermore, Charlie randomizes the phase φ
on state |√µeiφ〉 continuously from [0, 2pi). In this case,
the state prepared by Charlie can be written as
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
dφ |√µeiφ〉 〈√µeiφ| =
∞∑
k=0
P (k) |k〉 〈k| . (A32)
That is, in Protocol I, if Charlie prepares |√µeiφ〉 with
random phase φ, this is equivalent to preparing the Fock
states {|k〉} with probability P (k). Obviously, Fock
states {|k〉} are parity states. Then, by directly applying
Lemma 1, we can estimate the X-error by
EX =
∞∑
k=0
q2k+1e
Z
2k+1 +
∞∑
k=0
q2k(1− eZ2k), (A33)
where q0 is the detection caused by the vacuum signal
(i.e. dark counts) and eZ0 = e0 = 1/2 is the vacuum Z-
error rate.
The source components are Fock states {|k〉}, whose
yields {Yk} and Z-error rates {eZk } are independent of
µ. The fractions qµk of the “k-photon component” in the
final detected signals are given by
qµk = P
µ(k)
Yk
Qµ
. (A34)
The overall gain and QBER are given by
Qµ =
∞∑
k=0
Pµ(k)Yk,
EZµQµ =
∞∑
k=0
eZk P
µ(k)Yk.
(A35)
The main idea of the decoy-state method is that Alice
and Bob can obtain a set of linear equations in the form
of Eqs. (A34) and (A35) by using a few values of µ. When
an infinite amount of decoy states is used, Alice and Bob
can estimate all the parameters Yk and e
Z
k accurately,
with which they can estimate qµk , e
Z
k and the upper bound
of the X-error by Eq. (A33).
To apply the decoy-state method to protocols II and
III, we modify the phase randomization requirements ac-
cordingly. In the decoy-state version of Protocol III,
the phases φa, φb should be randomized independently
in [0, 2pi) rather than {0, pi}. Also, there will be an addi-
tional phase-sifting condition, |φa − φb| = 0 or pi. Such
random-phase announcement and postselection would
not affect the security, with the following reasons, simi-
lar to the argument of the equivalence between protocols
II and III. In particular, Observation 1 in Appendix A 4
still holds.
First, we want to argue that the random-phase postse-
lection of |φa−φb| = 0 or pi would not affect the security.
In fact, any phase postselection would not be affected
by Eve’s announcement. Note that the random phases
φa, φb are determined by Alice and Bob locally. Thus,
the sifted qubit pairs, ρ
(n)
A′B′ , would be the same in the
two cases: 1) Alice and Bob independently randomize
the phases, φa, φb, and employ this phase postselection
|φa−φb| = 0 or pi; 2) Charlie randomizes the same phases,
φa = φb, to A and B.
Second, we want to argue that the random-phase an-
nouncement would not affect the security. Eve announces
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the detection events before Alice and Bob’s random-
phase announcement. Thus, her hacking strategy cannot
depend on the random phases. Note that with the post-
selection of |φa − φb| = 0 or pi, the announced phase φa
(or φb) can be regarded as the phase reference in Protocol
III.
Third, we apply infinite decoy states to estimate qµk
and eZk accurately. In practical implementations, it is
interesting to explore if finite decoy states, such as the
widely applied vacuum and weak decoy states, are enough
to make a valid estimation.
Now, we can modify Protocol III with continuous
phase randomization φa, φb and the decoy-state method,
namely Protocol IV, as shown in Fig. 7(a).
Protocol IV
1. State preparation: Alice and Bob randomly select
µa, µb from a given set {µ0, µ1, ...}/2. They prepare
coherent state |√µa〉 and |√µb〉 on optical modes
A,B separately. They initial their qubits A′, B′ in
|+i〉 and independently add random phase φa, φb ∈
[0, 2pi) on the optical modes A,B. Alice applies the
control gate Cpi, defined in Eq. (A9), to qubit A
′
and optical pulse A. Similarly, Bob applies Cpi to
B′ and B.
2. Measurement: The two optical pulses A and B, are
sent to an untrusted party, Eve, who is supposed
to perform interference measurement and record
which detector (L or R) clicks.
3. Announcement: Eve announces the detection re-
sult, L/R click or failure, for each round.
4. Sifting: When Eve announces an L/R click, Al-
ice and Bob keep the qubits of systems A′ and B′.
Bob applies a Pauli Y -gate to his qubit if Eve’s an-
nouncement is R click. After Eve’s announcement,
Alice and Bob announce their encoded intensities
µa, µb and phases φa, φb. They keep the signal if
µa = µb and |φa − φb| = 0 (or pi). Bob applies a
Pauli Y -gate to his qubit if |φa − φb| = pi.
5. Parameter estimation: After many rounds of the
above steps, Alice and Bob end up with a joint 2n-
qubit state, denoted by ρ
(n)
A′B′ . They then perform
random sampling on the remaining ρ
(n)
A′B′ to esti-
mate EZ and infer EX by Eq. (A33).
6. Key distillation: Alice and Bob apply a stan-
dard EDP when the error rates are below a cer-
tain threshold. The distillation ratio r is given by
Eq. (A15). Once Alice and Bob obtain nr (almost)
pure EPR pairs, they both perform local Z mea-
surements on the qubits to generate private keys.
Finally, we need to reduce the entanglement-based pro-
tocol to a prepare-and-measure protocol. Following the
Shor-Preskill argument, we move the key measurement
in Step 6 before the EDP, the parameter estimation and
the Cpi gates. That is, they measure the systems A
′ and
B′ at the beginning. Therefore, the entanglement-based
protocol (Protocol IV) becomes the PM-QKD protocol,
as shown in Fig. 7(b).
PM-QKD protocol
1. State preparation: Alice randomly generates
a key bit κa ∈ {0, 1}, a random phase
φa ∈ [0, 2pi), and a random intensity µa ∈
{µ/2, µ1/2, µ2/2, · · · }. She prepares a coherent-
state optical pulse |√µaei(φa+piκa)〉A. Simi-
larly, Bob generates a key bit κb and prepares
|√µbei(φb+piκb)〉B .
2. Measurement: The two optical pulses A and B are
sent to an untrusted party, Eve, who is supposed
to perform interference measurement and record
which detector (L or R) clicks.
3. Announcement: Eve announces the detection re-
sult, L/R click or failure, for each round.
4. Sifting: When Eve announces an L/R click, Alice
and Bob keep the key bits, κa and κb. Bob flips his
key bit κb if Eve’s announcement is R click. After
Eve’s announcement, Alice and Bob announce their
encoded intensities and phases µa, φa;µb, φb. They
maintain the signal if µa = µb and |φa − φb| = 0 or
pi. Bob flips his key bit κb if |φa − φb| = pi.
5. Parameter estimation: After many rounds of the
above steps, Alice and Bob end up with joint n
pairs of the raw key. They then perform random
sampling on this raw key. With Eqs. (A34) and
(A35), they estimate qk and e
Z
k .
6. Key distillation: Alice and Bob apply classical com-
munication for error correction and privacy ampli-
fication. The key distillation ratio r is given by
Eq. (A15).
Note that the PM-QKD protocol mentioned above is
the exact PM-QKD protocol mentioned in the main text
with the decoy-state method contained.
Here, in Protocol IV and the PM-QKD protocol, there
are some unrealistic assumptions remaining.
1. The phase of Alice and Bob’s coherent state is
locked; that is, the phase reference of Alice’s and
Bob’s coherent state is the same.
2. The phase-sifting condition, φa = φb can be satis-
fied with an acceptable probability.
We will discuss how to remove these two requirements in
Appendix A 6, and, hence, make the protocol practical.
6. Phase PostCompensation
Here, we modify the PM-QKD protocol to remove the
requirement of phase locking between Alice and Bob, and
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FIG. 7. (a) Schematic diagram of Protocol IV, where the decoy-state method is applied. The random phase φa, φb ∈ [0, 2pi).
(b) Schematic diagram of PM-QKD protocol.
also relax the postselection condition of |φa − φb| = 0 or
pi. The method is shown in Fig. 2.
First, we relax the postselection condition of |φa−φb| =
0 or pi by dividing the phase interval [0, 2pi) into M slices
{∆j} for 0 ≤ j ≤ M − 1, where ∆j = [2pij/M, 2pi(j +
1)/M). We change the phase postselection condition of
φa = φb to slice postselection ja = jb. Here ja, jb are
defined as
ja = [
φa
2pi
M ] mod M,
jb = [
φb
2pi
M ] mod M,
(A36)
where [·] is the round function to output the nearest inte-
ger. That is, Alice announces the ja th slice ∆ja , which
her random phase φa falls into. Similarly, Bob announces
jb. The sifting condition is |jb − ja| = 0 or M/2. This
technique is first used in the phase-encoding MDI-QKD
[18]. Announcing the phase slices ja and jb rather than
the exact phase φa and φb will only leak less information
to Eve. Thus, all the security-proof results from previ-
ous subsections apply here. Applying Eq. (A15), we also
need to add a phase-sifting factor 2/M . Therefore, the
final key rate is given by
RPM ≥ 2
M
Qµ[1− fH(EZµ )−H(EXµ )], (A37)
where Qµ is the total gain of the pulses, E
Z
µ is the overall
QBER, the phase error rate EXµ is given by Eq. (A33),
and f is the error correction efficiency. We need to point
out that, when M is too small, the misalignment caused
by phase slices ∆ja and ∆jb is big and results in a large
QBER EZµ .
Second, we remove the requirement of phase locking.
In the phase postselection step, either Alice or Bob an-
nounces that the random phase is sufficient. Without
loss of generality, we assume that Alice announces the
phase and Bob performs the sifting of |jb − ja| = 0 or
M/2. With less information announced, the key rate
still holds.
Suppose that the difference between Alice’s and Bob’s
phase references, denoted by φ0 ∈ [0, 2pi), is fixed but
unknown. In sifting, Bob needs to figure out the value of
φ0. Define an offset, where 0 ≤ j0 ≤M − 1, as
j0 ≡ [φ0
2pi
M ] mod M, (A38)
During sifting, Bob can estimate the offset j0 for each
pulse. The estimation accuracy would not affect the se-
curity. In fact, in the security proofs, we assume that Eve
knows the phase references ahead. Suppose Bob compen-
sates the offset by jd, and he has the freedom to choose jd
from {0, 1, · · · ,M − 1}. In a practical scenario, normally
the phase references (and, hence, the offset j0) change
slowly with time. Then, Bob can figure out the proper
phase compensation offset jd by minimizing the QBER
from random sampling, as shown in Fig. 2.
For the case where the phase reference difference φ0
varies, we can treat the changing caused by Eve. Such
deviation will introduce bit errors, but not help Eve learn
key information, since the variation of φ0 is independent
of the key κa, κb. Note that in the security proof, we
assume that Eve knows the phase references accurately.
With all the modifications above, we propose the fol-
lowing practical version of PM-QKD protocol.
PM-QKD protocol with phase
postcompensation
1. State preparation: Alice randomly generates
a key bit κa ∈ {0, 1}, a random phase
φa ∈ [0, 2pi), and a random intensity µa ∈
{µ/2, µ1/2, µ2/2, · · · }. She prepares a coherent-
state optical pulse |√µaei(φa+piκa)〉A. Simi-
larly, Bob generates a key bit κb and prepares
|√µbei(φb+piκb)〉B .
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2. Measurement: The optical pulses, systems A and
B, are sent to an untrusted party, Eve, who is sup-
posed to perform interference measure and record
which detector (L or R) clicks.
3. Announcement: Eve announces the detection re-
sults, L/R click or failure, for each round.
4. Sifting: When Eve announces an L/R click, Alice
and Bob keep the key bits, κa and κb. Bob flips his
key bit κb if Eve’s announcement is R click. After
Eve’s announcement, Alice and Bob announce their
encoded intensities µa and µb, respectively. They
keep the bits if µa = µb.
5. Parameter estimation: Alice and Bob run the above
procedures many times and then run the following
procedures.
(a) For each bit, Alice announces the phase slice
index ja, given in Eq. (A36), and she ran-
domly samples a certain amount of key bits
and announces them for QBER testing.
(b) In the phase postcompensation method, given
an offset compensation jd ∈ {0, 1, ...,M/2−1},
Bob sifts the sampled bits with the phase post-
selection condition |jb + jd − ja| mod M = 0
or M/2. For the case of M/2, Bob flips the key
bit κb. After sifting, Bob calculates the QBER
EZ with Alice’s sampling key bits. Bob tries
all possible jd ∈ {0, 1, · · · ,M−1}, and figures
out the proper jd to minimize the sampling
QBER. Using the phase postselection condi-
tion with the proper jd, Bob sifts (and flips
if needed) the unsampled bits and announces
the locations to Alice. Alice sifts her key bits
accordingly.
(c) Alice and Bob analyze the overall gain Qµi
and QBER EZµi for different values of intensi-
ties µa = µb = µi/2. They estimate the phase
error rate E
(X)
µ by Eq. (A33).
6. Key distillation: Alice and Bob apply error correc-
tion and privacy amplification. The key rate r is
given by Eq. (A37).
Here, in the phase postcompensation, Bob does not
need to fix a jd for the whole experiment. Instead, he
can adjust jd in real time. Given the total number of
slices M , define the phase-stable time, τM , to be the time
period during which the phase fluctuation is smaller than
pi/M . Roughly speaking, Bob adjusts jd for every τM .
In practice, Bob would randomly sample some detections
for tests. Here, in order to obtain a good estimation of jd,
Bob should sample enough detections for the offset test
within τM . Then, the phase postcompensation method
would put a requirement on the detection rate.
Now, we consider a practical example. Considering the
slice number M = 16, the tolerable fluctuation should be
about pi/M = 0.196 rad. The phase of a continuous-
wave (CW) laser pulse usually fluctuates randomly, and
its behavior can be modeled as a random walk. In an
experimental work of testing the phase drift for a 36.5-
km Mach-Zehnder interferometer [43], within a time du-
ration of 0.2 ms, the mean phase fluctuation is about
0.15 rad. In the data presented in recent TF-QKD [16],
via the total transmission distance around 200 km, the
phase drift rate is about 3 rad ms−1. For a time pe-
riod of 0.05 ms, the mean phase fluctuation is about 0.15
rad, which is less than pi/M . Then, in this case, one
can set τM = 0.05 ms for testing. Considering a GHz
QKD system, there are 5 × 104 signals sent out within
τM . Using the same parameters for a longer transmis-
sion distance of 100 km from Alice to Eve (same distance
for Bob) using standard telecom fiber (0.2 dB/km), the
transmission loss is η = 20 dB = 10−2, and there will be
500 data left for post-processing, which is sufficient for
sampling tests. From here, one can see that our phase
postcompensation method is feasible with current tech-
nology. For a longer transmission distance, the phase
postcompensation method may not be sufficient. One
can use the phase calibration method as an alternative,
as introduced in the main text.
Appendix B: Model and Simulation
Here, we show the details for the simulations of dif-
ferent QKD schemes. We mainly follow the simulation
model used in the literature [19, 44]. We calculate the de-
tection probabilities of PM-QKD in Appendix B 1, and
then evaluate the yields, gains, and error rates in Ap-
pendix B 2. In simulations, we also compare the per-
formance of PM-QKD with the decoy-state BB84 [1],
MDI-QKD [15], and the linear key-rate bound [11]. We
list the used formulas and simulation parameters in Ap-
pendix B 3.
1. Detection probabilities
The channel is assumed to be a pure loss one and sym-
metric for Alice and Bob with transmittance η (with de-
tector efficiency ηd taken into account). We suppose that
the lights from Alice and Bob faithfully interfere and are
measured with dark-count rate pd. Without loss of gen-
erality, we only consider the case where κa = κb = 0,
ja = jb = 0.
In PM-QKD, the global phases φa, φb are divided into
M slices. Without phase locking, the phase references
for Alice and Bob can differ. Therefore, even if the an-
nounced slices meet, |ja − jb| = 0, there may be a con-
siderable difference φδ ≡ φb − φa between the two global
phases φa, φb.
First, for a fixed φδ, we calculate the detection prob-
ability in the single-photon case. After Alice and Bob’s
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encoding, the state becomes
(eiφaa† + eiφbb†) |00〉A0,B0 = (a† + eiφδb†) |0〉 . (B1)
Here, the transmittance η includes channel losses and
detection efficiencies, which transfer a†, b† according to
a† → √ηa† +
√
1− ηs†,
b† → √ηb† +
√
1− ηt†,
(B2)
where s†, t† are the modes coupled to the environment.
Before Eve’s interference, the state is
(
√
η(a† + eiφδb†) +
√
1− η(s† + eiφδ t†)) |0〉 , (B3)
and after Eve’s interference, the state becomes
{
√
η
2
[(1+eiφδ)l†+(1−eiφδ)r†]+
√
1− η(s†+eiφδ t†)} |0〉 ,
(B4)
where l† and r† are the creation operators for the modes
to L- and R-detectors, respectively. Then, the detection
probabilities are given by
p
(1)
0 = 1− η,
p
(1)
l = η cos
2(
φδ
2
),
p(1)r = η sin
2(
φδ
2
),
p
(1)
lr = 0,
(B5)
where p
(1)
0 , p
(1)
l , p
(1)
r , and p
(1)
lr are, respectively, the prob-
abilities for no click, L click, R click, and double click for
the single-photon case.
Then, we consider the k-photon case, for which we
regard as k identical and independent click events of the
single-photon case; the click probabilities are given by
p
(k)
0 = (p
(1)
0 )
k,
p
(k)
l = (p
(1)
0 + p
(1)
l )
k − (p(1)0 )k,
p(k)r = (p
(1)
0 + p
(1)
r )
k − (p(1)0 )k,
p
(k)
lr = 1− p(k)0 − p(k)l − p(k)r
= 1 + (p
(1)
0 )
k − (p(1)0 + p(1)l )k − (p(1)0 + p(1)r )k,
(B6)
where p
(k)
0 , p
(k)
l , p
(k)
r , and p
(k)
lr are, respectively, the prob-
abilities for no-click, L click, R click, and double click for
the k-photon case.
Now, we take into account the effects caused by the
detector dark counts pd. Since the dark counts are inde-
pendent of the photon-click events, we can draw a table
for all the cases, as shown in Table I. The final click prob-
abilities for the k-photon case are given by
P
(k)
0 = (1− pd)2p(k)0 ,
P
(k)
L = (1− pd)2p(k)l + pd(1− pd)(p(k)0 + p(k)l )
= pd(1− pd)p(k)0 + (1− pd)p(k)l ,
P
(k)
R = (1− pd)2p(k)r + pd(1− pd)(p(k)0 + p(k)r )
= pd(1− pd)p(k)0 + (1− pd)p(k)r ,
P
(k)
LR = (1− pd)2p(k)lr + pd(1− pd)(p(k)l + p(k)r + 2p(k)lr ) + p2d
= (1− p2d)p(k)lr + pd(1− pd)(p(k)l + p(k)r ) + p2d.
(B7)
Similarly, we can derive the formulas for detection
probabilities with coherent state inputs. The states
sent out by Alice and Bob are |√µaeiφa〉 and |√µbeiφb〉,
respectively, where µa = µb = µ/2. After channel
and detection losses, the states become |√ηµaeiφa〉 and
|√ηµbeiφb〉. By going through the BS, the states become
|αL〉 = |
√
ηµ
2
(eiφa + eiφb)〉 = |
√
ηµ
2
eiφa(1 + eiφδ)〉 ,
|αR〉 = |
√
ηµ
2
(eiφa − eiφb)〉 = |
√
ηµ
2
eiφa(1− eiφδ)〉 .
(B8)
Then, the detection click probabilities are
Pµ(L¯) = (1− pd) exp (−|αL|2)
= (1− pd) exp (−ηµ cos2(φδ
2
) ),
Pµ(L) = 1− Pµ(L¯),
Pµ(R¯) = (1− pd) exp (−|αR|2)
= (1− pd) exp (−ηµ sin2(φδ
2
) ),
Pµ(R) = 1− Pµ(R¯),
(B9)
where Pµ(L) and Pµ(L¯) are the probabilities of the L
click and no L click, respectively, and Pµ(R) and Pµ(R¯)
are for the R-detector. These probabilities are similar
to Eq. (B7). The difference is that the probabilities in
Eq. (B7) are mutually exclusive, while in Eq. (B9), the
probabilities Pµ(L) and Pµ(R) are independent.
All the above probability formulas are functions of the
phase difference φδ. In the simulation, one needs to inte-
grate φδ over its probability distribution fφδ(φ). Recall
that the phase reference deviation between Alice and Bob
is φ0. Here, with the phase postcompensation method
introduced in Appendix A 6, we assume that φ0 is uni-
formly distributed in [−pi/M, pi/M), denoted by
φ0 ∼ U [−pi/M, pi/M). (B10)
In this case, φa and φb are uniformly distributed in
[0, 2pi/M) and [φ0, 2pi/M + φ0), respectively,
φa ∼ U [0, 2pi/M),
φb ∼ U [φ0, 2pi/M + φ0). (B11)
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Dark count condition Contributions to the overall click probabilities
L-dark count R-dark count No-click P
(k)
0 L click P
(k)
L R click P
(k)
R Double-click P
(k)
LR
(1− pd) (1− pd) p(k)0 p(k)l p(k)r p(k)lr
(1− pd) pd 0 0 p(k)0 + p(k)r p(k)l + p(k)lr
pd (1− pd) 0 p(k)0 + p(k)l 0 p(k)r + p(k)lr
pd pd 0 0 0 1
TABLE I. Probability table of clicks with dark counts present.
For a fixed φ0, the probability distribution of the phase
difference φδ is given by
f
(φ0)
φδ
(φ) =

(M2pi )
2[φ+ ( 2piM − φ0)] φ ∈ [φ0 − 2piM , φ0),
(M2pi )
2[−φ+ ( 2piM + φ0)] φ ∈ [φ0, φ0 + 2piM ),
0 otherwise.
(B12)
Furthermore, in the simulation, one needs to take an-
other integration of φ0 over [−pi/M, pi/M) to get the
yields, gain, and error rates.
2. Yields, gain, and error rates
We first analyze the yield {Yk} for k ≥ 0 and the total
gain Qµ according to the probability formulas given in
Appendix B 1. Note that, in PM-QKD, both no-click
and double-click events are regarded as failure detection.
The yield Yk of the k-photon state is given by Eqs. (B5),
(B6), and (B7),
Yk = P
(k)
L + P
(k)
R
= (1− pd)(p(k)l + p(k)r ) + 2pd(1− pd)p(k)0
= (1− pd)[(1− η sin2(φδ
2
))k + (1− η cos2(φδ
2
))k]− 2(1− pd)2(1− η)k
≈ (1− pd)(1 + (1− η)k)− 2(1− pd)2(1− η)k
= (1− pd)[1− (1− 2pd)(1− η)k]
≈ 1− (1− 2pd)(1− η)k.
(B13)
Here, in the first approximation, we take the first order
of a small φδ and ignore sin
2(
φδ
2
) = 0. In the second
approximation, we omit the higher-order term pd(1−(1−
2pd)(1− η)k) = O(p2d + pdη), since normally pd is small.
The total gain Qµ is given by Eq. (B9),
Qµ = P (L)P (R¯) + P (L¯)P (R)
= (1− pd) exp (−ηµ sin2(φδ
2
) )[1− (1− pd) exp (−ηµ cos2(φδ
2
) )]
+ (1− pd) exp (−ηµ cos2(φδ
2
) )[1− (1− pd) exp (−ηµ sin2(φδ
2
) )]
≈ (1− pd)[1− (1− pd) exp (−ηµb)] + pd(1− pd) exp (−ηµb)
= (1− pd)[1− (1− 2pd)e−ηµ]
≈ 1− e−ηµ + 2pde−ηµ,
(B14)
where the two approximations are the same as the ones
used in Eq. (B13). Since φδ does not affect the yields Yk
and gainQµ much with the first-order approximation, the
average yields Yk and gain Qµ over φδ ∈ [−pi/M, pi/M)
can be regarded as the ones when φδ = 0. Also, the
results of Eqs. (B13) and (B14) are consistent with the
ones presented in the regular QKD model [44], as shown
in Eqs. (B29) and (B30).
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Then, we calculate the bit error rate for the k-photon
signal eZk and the QBER E
Z
µ with coherent states input
µa = µb = µ/2. The bit error rate e
Z
k (φδ) is given by
eZk (φδ) =
P
(k)
R
P
(k)
L + P
(k)
R
, (B15)
where P
(k)
L and P
(k)
R are given by Eqs. (B5), (B6), and
(B7). The average bit error rate of eZk over φδ is given
by the following integral,
eZk =
M
2pi
∫ pi/M
−pi/M
dφ0
∫ 3pi/M
−3pi/M
dφ f
(φ0)
φδ
(φ)eZk (φ), (B16)
where f
(φ0)
φδ
(φ) is given by Eq. (B12). For the case
k = 1, we explicitly calculate the error rate eZ1 , given
by Eqs. (B5), (B6), (B7), and (B15),
eZ1 (φδ) =
(1− pd)2p(1)l + pd(1− pd)(p(1)0 + p(1)l )
(1− pd)2η + pd(1− pd)(2− η)
=
sin2(φδ/2)η + pd(1− η)
η + 2pd(1− η) ,
(B17)
and integrate Eq. (B17) with Eq. (B16),
eZ1 =
M
2pi
∫ pi/M
−pi/M
dφ0
∫ 3pi/M
−3pi/M
dφ f
(φ0)
φδ
(φ)eZ1 (φ)
=
eδη + pd(1− η)
η + 2pd(1− η) ,
(B18)
where
eδ =
pi
M
− M
2
pi2
sin3
( pi
M
)
(B19)
can be regarded as the misalignment error rate. Equa-
tion (B18) can be understood that, if a signal causes a
click, the error rate is eδ; and if a dark count causes a
click, the error rate is e0 = 1/2. Since the double-click
events are discarded, when both a signal and a dark count
cause clicks, the error rate is eδ. Then, we can approx-
imate eZk with the same spirit, for the contributions in
Yk, given in Eq. (B13),
eZk ≈
pd(1− η)k + eδ[1− (1− η)k]
Yk
. (B20)
Here, note that in Eq. (B20), we ignore the double clicks
caused by multiphoton signals, which would further re-
duce the misalignment error and, hence, the value of eZk .
The QBER EZµ (φδ) for a given φδ is given by substituting
Eq. (B9),
EZµ (φδ) =
P (L¯)P (R)
P (L¯)P (R) + P (L)P (R¯)
=
1
Qµ
(1− pd) exp (−ηµ cos2(φδ
2
)){1− (1− pd) exp[−ηµ sin2(φδ
2
)]}
=
1
Qµ
(1− pd){exp [−ηµ cos2(φδ
2
)]− (1− pd)e−ηµ}
≈ e
−ηµ
Qµ
[pd + ηµ sin
2(
φδ
2
)]
(B21)
similar to Eq. (B18),
EZµ =
M
2pi
∫ pi/M
−pi/M
dφ0
∫ 3pi/M
−3pi/M
dφ f
(φ0)
φδ
(φ)EZµ (φδ)
≈ (pd + ηµeδ)e
−ηµ
Qµ
,
(B22)
where eδ is given in Eq. (B19). The results of Eqs. (B22)
and (B18) are consistent with the one presented in the
regular QKD model [44], as shown in Eqs. (B29) and
(B30), with a slight difference. The difference is caused
by how the double-click events are processed. In BB84,
Alice and Bob need to randomly assign a bit to double
clicks, while in PM-QKD, double clicks are discarded.
Now, we can evaluate the key rate with the above
model. Let us restate the key-rate formula, Eq. (A37),
RPM ≥ 2
M
Qµ[1− fH(EZµ )−H(EXµ )], (B23)
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where the phase error rate is given by Eq. (A33),
EXµ =
∞∑
k=0
q2k+1e
Z
2k+1 +
∞∑
k=0
q2k(1− eZ2k),
≤ q0eZ0 +
∞∑
k=0
eZ2k+1q2k+1 + (1− q0 − qodd).
(B24)
In simulation, Qµ and E
Z
µ are given by Eqs. (B14) and
(B22). The fractions, {qk} with k ≥ 0, of different photon
components k contributing to the valid detections (L/R
clicks) are given by
qk =
P (k)Yk
Qµ
= e−µ
µk
k!
Yk
Qµ
. (B25)
For the odd-photon-number component, we have
qodd =
∞∑
k=0
q2k+1
=
1
Qµ
∞∑
k=0
Y2k+1µ
2k+1e−µ
(2k + 1)!
=
e−µ
Qµ
∞∑
k=0
{ µ
2k+1
(2k + 1)!
− (1− 2pd) [(1− η)µ]
2k+1
(2k + 1)!
}
=
e−µ
Qµ
{sinh(µ)− (1− 2pd) sinh[(1− η)µ]}.
(B26)
To simplify the simulation, we explicitly calculate the
eZk and qk for 0 ≤ k ≤ 5. Further zooming into Eq. (B24),
we have
EXµ =
∞∑
k=0
q2k+1e
Z
2k+1 +
∞∑
k=0
q2k(1− eZ2k),
≤ q0eZ0 + (q1eZ1 + q3eZ3 + q5eZ5 ) + (1− q0 − q1 − q3 − q5),
(B27)
where eZk and qk are given by Eqs. (B15) and (B25),
respectively.
Here, we attach the MALTAB code of PM-QKD key
rate for reference.
1 function [RPM] = PMKey( eta ,mu, pd ,M, Ef )
2
3 % k−photon y i e l d s Yk by Eq . ( B13)
4 Y0 = 2∗pd ;
5 Y1 = 1 − (1 − 2∗pd) .∗ ( 1 − eta ) ;
6 Y3 = 1 − (1 − 2∗pd) .∗ ( 1 − eta ) ˆ3 ;
7 Y5 = 1 − (1 − 2∗pd) .∗ ( 1 − eta ) ˆ5 ;
8
9 % t o t a l gain Q by Eq . ( B14)
10 Qmu = 1 − (1 − 2∗pd) .∗exp(−mu.∗ eta ) ;
11
12 % k−photon c l i c k e d f r a c t i o n s by Eq . ( B25)
13 q0 = Y0.∗exp(−mu) . /Qmu;
14 q1 = Y1.∗mu.∗exp(−mu) . /Qmu;
15 q3 = Y3 . ∗ (mu. ˆ 3 ) .∗exp(−mu) . / ( f a c t o r i a l
( 3 ) ∗Qmu) ;
16 q5 = Y5 . ∗ (mu. ˆ 5 ) .∗exp(−mu) . / ( f a c t o r i a l
( 5 ) ∗Qmu) ;
17
18 % k−photon b i t e r ro r r a t e by Eq . ( B20)
19 e0 = 0 . 5 ;
20 e d e l t a = pi/M − (M/pi ) ˆ2 ∗ ( sin ( pi/M) )
ˆ3 ;
21 e1Z = ( pd∗(1− eta ) + e d e l t a ∗(1 − (1−
eta ) ) ) /Y1 ;
22 e3Z = ( pd∗(1− eta ) ˆ3 + e d e l t a ∗(1 − (1−
eta ) ˆ3) ) /Y3 ;
23 e5Z = ( pd∗(1− eta ) ˆ5 + e d e l t a ∗(1 − (1−
eta ) ˆ5) ) /Y5 ;
24
25 % QBER by Eq . ( B22)
26 % EZPM = (2∗ p i /M) ∗ ( pd + eta ∗mu∗ e d e l t a
) .∗ exp(−e ta ∗mu) . /Qmu; % o r i g i n a l
errneous code
27 EZPM = ( pd + eta ∗mu∗ e d e l t a ) .∗exp(−eta ∗
mu) . /Qmu;
28
29 % phase e rro r r a t e EX by Eq . ( B27)
30 EX = q0 .∗ e0 + q1 .∗ e1Z + q3 .∗ e3Z + q5 .∗
e5Z + (1 − q0 − q1 − q3 − q5 ) ;
31 EX = min(EX, 0 . 5 ) ;
32
33 % key r a t e by Eq . ( B23)
34 rPM = −Ef .∗h(EZPM) + 1 − h(EX) ;
35 RPM = (2/M) .∗Qmu.∗rPM;
36 RPM = max(RPM, 0 ) ;
37 end
38
39 function [ entropy ] = h(p)
40 entropy = −p .∗ log2 (p)−(1−p) .∗ log2(1−p) ;
41 entropy (p<=0 | p>=1) = 0 ;
42 end
3. Simulation formulas for BB84 and MDI-QKD
protocol and simulation parameters
We compare our derived key rate with that of the
prepare-and-measure BB84 [1] protocol, whose key rate
is given by the GLLP-decoy method [23].
The key rate of the decoy-state BB84 protocol is given
by [25]
RBB84 =
1
2
Qµ{−fH(EZµ ) + q1[1−H(eX1 )]}, (B28)
where 1/2 is the basis sifting factor.
In the simulation, the yield and error rates of the k-
photon component are given by [19]
Yk = 1− (1− Y0)(1− η)k,
ek = ed +
(e0 − ed)Y0
Yk
,
(B29)
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where ed is the intrinsic misalignment error rate caused
by a phase reference mismatch. The gain and QBER are
given by
Qµ =
∞∑
k=0
µke−µ
k!
Yk,
= 1− (1− Y0)e−ηµ,
Eµ =
∞∑
k=0
µke−µ
k!
ekYk,
= ed +
(e0 − ed)Y0
Qµ
,
(B30)
where Y0 = 2pd and e0 = 1/2.
The key rate of MDI-QKD is given by [15]
RMDI =
1
2
{Q11[1−H(e11)]− fQrectH(Erect)},
(B31)
where Q11 = µaµbe
−µa−µbY11 and 1/2 is the basis sifting
factor. We take this formula from Eq. (B27) in Ref. [18].
In simulation, the gain and error rates are given by
Y11 = (1− pd)2[ηaηb
2
+ (2ηa + 2ηb − 3ηaηb)pd + 4(1− ηa)(1− ηb)p2d],
e11 = e0Y11 − (e0 − ed)(1− p2d)
ηaηb
2
,
Qrect = Q
(C)
rect +Q
(E)
rect,
Q
(C)
rect = 2(1− pd)2e−µ
′/2[1− (1− pd)e−ηaµa/2][1− (1− pd)e−ηbµb/2],
Q
(E)
rect = 2pd(1− pd)2e−µ
′/2[I0(2x)− (1− pd)e−µ′/2];
ErectQrect = edQ
(C)
rect + (1− ed)Q(E)rect,
(B32)
Here,
µ′ = ηaµa + ηbµb,
x =
1
2
√
ηaµaηbµb,
(B33)
where µ′ denotes the average number of photons reaching
Eve’s beam splitter, and µa = µb = µ/2, ηa = ηb = η.
We take these formulas from Eqs. (A9), (A11), (B7), and
(B28)-(B31) in Ref. [18].
In 2014, Takeoka et al. derived an upper bound of the
key rate of the point-to-point-type QKD protocols [10],
RTGW = − log2(
1− η
1 + η
). (B34)
Later, Pirandola et al. established a tight upper bound
[11],
RPLOB = − log2(1− η), (B35)
which is the linear key-rate bound used in the main text.
Note that Eq. (B35) is the secret key capacity of the
pure loss channel, as it coincides with the lower bound
previously known [45].
Appendix C: Beam-splitting Attack: Invalidation of
the photon number channel model
Here, we argue that the tagging technique does not
work for PM-QKD, by showing that the lower bound of
the key rate from naively employing the tagging tech-
nique can be higher than an upper bound derived from
a specific attack, in some parameter regime. The failure
of the tagging technique stems from the failure of the
photon number channel model used in the security proof
[19]. In other words, the photon number channel model
does not hold for the case when the random phases are
announced during postprocessing.
1. Key rate with or without the photon number
channel
Assuming the existence of the photon number channel
model in PM-QKD, we can apply the tagging method and
obtain a key-rate formula following the GLLP analysis
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[23, 25],
rGLLP = q1[1−H(eX1 )]− fH(EZµ ), (C1)
where q1 is the single-photon detection ratio, e
X
1 and E
Z
µ
are the single-photon phase error rate and total QBER,
and f is the error correction efficiency.
As for comparison, our PM-QKD key-rate formula is
given by Eq. (A15),
rPM = 1−H(EZµ )−H(EXµ ), (C2)
where EXµ is bounded by Eq. (B27)
EXµ =
∞∑
k=0
q2k+1e
Z
2k+1 +
∞∑
k=0
q2k(1− eZ2k),
≤ q0eZ0 + (q1eZ1 + q3eZ3 + q5eZ5 ) + (1− q0 − q1 − q3 − q5).
(C3)
2. Beam-splitting attack
Now, we consider a beam-splitting attack (BS-attack),
where Eve sets beam splitters with transmittance η on
both Alice and Bob’s side to simulate a lossy channel.
She intercepts the pulses on A and B, regardless of the
keys and bases of the pulses, and stores the reflected
lights on her quantum memories, modes A0 and B0. Eve
interferes the two transmitted pulses, modes A1 and B1,
and announces the results. After Alice’s and Bob’s phase
announcements, Eve performs an unambiguous state dis-
crimination (USD) [46] on the states on modes A0 and
B0 separately to guess the key information. Since the
states on A0(B0) and A1(B1) are uncorrelated because
of the beam splitting of coherent states, the BS-attack
will not introduce any error or other detectable effects.
Apparently, this BS-attack is an individual attack. We
will calculate Eve’s successful probability for guessing the
key bits unambiguously, and calculate the mutual infor-
mation I(κa(b) : E), from which we can derive an upper
bound on the secure key rate.
In PM-QKD, Alice and Bob prepare coherent states
{|√µaei(φa+κa)〉A and |
√
µbe
i(φb+κb)〉
B
}, where µa =
µb = µ/2, φa, φb ∈ [0, 2pi) are the random phases, and
κa, κb ∈ {0, pi} are the key information. The states on
system A0, B0 reflected by Eve’s beam splitters are given
by
|
√
(1− η)µaei(φa+κa)〉A0 ,
|
√
(1− η)µbei(φb+κb)〉B0 .
(C4)
The two remaining pulses on the system A1, B1, used for
interference are given by
|√ηµaei(φa+κa)〉A1 ,
|√ηµbei(φb+κb)〉B1 .
(C5)
Suppose Eve interferes systems A1 and B1; then the total
gain Qµ is given by
Qµ = 1− e−ηµ. (C6)
Here, we consider the signal with φa = φb, and Eve holds
perfect single-photon detectors. Without loss of general-
ity, we consider Eve’s attack on system A0. If Eve cannot
get the sifted phase information φa, then no matter the
value of key phases κa, the state on A0 from Eve’s per-
spective is
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
dφa |
√
(1− η)µaei(φa+κa)〉A0 〈
√
(1− η)µaei(φa+κa)| =
∞∑
k=0
P (1−η)µa(k) |k〉A0 〈k| , (C7)
where
P (1−η)µa(k) =
[(1− η)µa]k
k!
e−(1−η)µa . (C8)
In this case, Eve cannot obtain any information about
κa. While in PM-QKD, the phase φa will be announced.
In this case, Eve can first rotate the states on system A0
by −φa. Now, the state becomes
1
2
(|
√
(1− η)µa〉A0 〈
√
(1− η)µa|
+ |−
√
(1− η)µa〉A0 〈−
√
(1− η)µa|).
(C9)
Then, Eve only needs to determine whether the phase
κa is 0 or pi to obtain the key information. As shown
in Ref. [46], if two pure states |p〉 and |q〉 are prepared
with the same a priori 1/2, the maximum probability of
unambiguous discrimination is
Pdes = 1− | 〈p|q〉 |. (C10)
Therefore, the probability of successfully distinguishing
the states |√(1− η)µa〉 and |−√(1− η)µa〉 is given by
Psuc = 1−| 〈
√
(1− η)µa| −
√
(1− η)µa〉 | = 1−e−(1−η)µ.
(C11)
Note that Eve already know the value κa − κb with in-
terference results on A1, B1. Eve only needs to learn
either of κa or κb. Thus, Eve’s successful unambiguous
measurement probability is
PBS = 1− (1− Psuc)2 = 1− e−2(1−η)µ. (C12)
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If the light intensity µ is large enough, PBS = 1, then Eve
can learn the key information with a high probability.
With unambiguous state discrimination, the mutual
information of Eve’s measurement result (denoted by
variable E) and Alice’s and Bob’s key κa(b) is
I(κa(b) : E) = PBS = 1− e−2(1−η)µ. (C13)
Suppose that there is no extra error induced by other
factors; then the BS-attack provides an upper bound on
the key rate,
rBS = [1− I(κa(b) : E)]
= e−2(1−η)µ
=
e−2µ
(1−Qµ)2 .
(C14)
Here, the third equality is based on Eq. (C6).
3. Comparison
Now we make a simulation to compare the key rate in
the following cases: with the “tagging” method, by our
security proof, and the upper bound under BS-attack.
In the discussion, we neglect the misalignment error and
dark counts.
First, under BS-attack, the yield is given by
Yk = 1− (1− η)k, (C15)
and the fraction of the k-photon component is
qk = (e
−µµ
k
k!
)
Yk
Qµ
= [1− (1− η)k]e
−µµk
k!Qµ
. (C16)
Note that q0 = 0.
Second, in the BS-attack scenario, Eve’s operations
will not introduce any error; hence,
eZk = 0, ∀k ≥ 0,
EZµ = 0.
(C17)
Then Eqs. (C1), (A15), and (B27) can be simplified to
rGLLP = q1
= ηµe−µ,
rPM = [1−H(EX)]
≥ [1−H(1− q1 − q3 − q5)].
(C18)
We compare the key-rate formula rGLLP , rPM in
Eq. (C18) with the key-rate upper bound by BS-attack
rBS in Eq. (C14). We set the total light intensity to
be a typical value µ = 0.5, and we adjust η to com-
pare the key-rate performance. As shown in Fig. 8, the
GLLP “tagging” formula for the “single-photon” compo-
nent cannot hold under the BS-attack for a transmittance
η < 0.6. If we fix the transmittance η = 0.2 and adjust
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FIG. 8. Key-rate comparison with fixed light intensity µ =
0.5. Here we can see that the GLLP tagging formula for the
single-photon component cannot hold under the BS-attack
when the transmittance η < 0.6.
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FIG. 9. Key-rate comparison with fixed transmittance η =
0.2. The GLLP tagging formula for the single-photon compo-
nent cannot hold under the BS-attack.
µ, Fig. 9 shows that the GLLP tagging formula cannot
hold under the BS-attack.
The BS-attack results serve to invalidate the tagging
method even the single-photon component cannot exist,
since the announcement of phase φa, φb will leak more
information of the key bits κa and κb.
Recently, Wang et al. proposed an eavesdropping
strategy to the TF-QKD protocol [47]. The attack can
also be performed against the PM-QKD protocol. Un-
der such an attack, Eve can learn all the key bits. The
key rate provided by the GLLP formula, Eq. (C1), is 0.5
(for all the clicked signals) while that given by our secu-
rity proof is strictly 0. This also shows the invalidation
of the GLLP key-rate formula, and our security proof is
still valid under such an attack.
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Appendix D: Comparison with other phase-encoding
MDI-QKD
Here, we compare three related phase-encoding MDI-
QKD protocols, including the previous phase-encoding
MDI-QKD (Scheme I in Ref. [17]), the recently proposed
TF-QKD [16], and our protocol (PM-QKD). For the sim-
plicity of the statements, we assume that the phase ref-
erence of Alice and Bob is locked in all the protocols.
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FIG. 10. (a) Schematic diagram of phase-encoding MDI-QKD
(Scheme I in Ref. [17]). (b) Schematic diagram of TF-QKD,
which is the decoy-state version of the scheme in (a). (c)
Schematic diagram of d-phase PM-QKD.
1. Phase-encoding MDI-QKD
In the phase encoding MDI-QKD (Scheme I in
Ref. [17]), Alice generates two random bits κa, βa
as the key and the random choice of the X or
Y basis, respectively, and then generates a coherent
pulse |√µ/2ei(piκa+piβa/2)〉
A
. Similarly, Bob generates
|√µ/2ei(piκb+piβb/2)〉
B
. They send their coherent pulses
to Eve, who is supposed to perform an interference mea-
surement and announce the detection results [Fig. 10(a)].
After Eve’s announcement, Alice and Bob announce the
basis information βa, βb and perform basis sifting.
Note that there is only single-photon detection in this
protocol. Therefore, the number of clicked signals scales
with O(
√
η), where η is the total transmittance between
Alice and Bob. However, there is a considerable source
flaw caused by using a coherent state as an approximation
of an ideal single photon state, resulting in a final key rate
of O(η).
2. TF-QKD
To avoid the performance deterioration caused by the
source flaw in the phase-encoding MDI-QKD protocol
above, a natural idea is to apply the decoy-state method
[25], that is, to perform phase randomization, and to es-
timate the fraction of q1 and the error rate e1 of the
single-photon component.
Recently, Lucamarini et al. modified the phase-
encoding QKD protocol, namely TF-QKD [16]. As
shown in Fig. 10(b), Alice generates two random bits
κa, βa as the key, chooses randomly the X or Y basis,
and modulates another random phase φa for the phase
randomization in the decoy-state method. She generates
a coherent pulse |√µ/2ei(piκa+piβa/2+φa)〉
A
. Similarly,
Bob generates a coherent pulse |√µ/2ei(piκb+piβb/2+φb)〉
B
.
They send their coherent pulses to Eve, who is supposed
to perform the interference measurement and announce
the detection results. After Eve’s announcement, Alice
and Bob announce βa, βb;φa, φb and perform basis sifting
and phase sifting.
3. d-phase phase-matching QKD
In the d-phase PM-QKD, Alice first generates a ran-
dom integer κa ∈ {0, 1, ..., d − 1} and then prepares a
coherent pulse |√µ/2 exp (iκa 2pi
d
)〉
A
. Similarly, Bob gen-
erates κb ∈ {0, 1, ..., d − 1} and prepares a similar state
|√µ/2 exp (iκb 2pi
d
)〉
B
. They send their coherent pulses
to Eve, who is supposed to perform an interference mea-
surement and announce the detection results. If Eve
announces detector L/R clicks, Alice and Bob keep the
numbers κa, κb and which detector clicks.
After many rounds of the steps above, Alice and Bob
randomly select some of the data, announce them, and
calculate the L/R detection probability for each case. By
the estimated probabilities, they calculate the key rate
and extract private keys.
As we can see, after Eve’s announcement, Alice and
Bob will share some mutual information. While Eve can-
not fully learn the variable κa, the information-secure key
can be generated between Alice and Bob.
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The PM-QKD protocol in the main text and Appendix
A corresponds to the case of d = 2, which is combined
with a random phase announcement and the decoy-state
method. In Appendix A, we completed the proof for the
PM-QKD of d = 2 with a random phase announcement.
The security proof for this generalized case is left for
future work.
4. Comparison of different protocols
In all three protocols, phase-encoding MDI-QKD [17],
TF-QKD [16], and PM-QKD, single-detection clicks on
the untrusted node are used as successful measurement
events, whose rate scales with O(
√
η). Technically, this
is the precondition of the key rate having square-root
scaling[16]. Nevertheless, in the phase-encoding MDI
scheme, without phase randomization, the single-photon
source can be approximated by two weak coherent states,
which decreases significantly the key rate of the protocol
to O(η). In TF-QKD, a single-qubit view is taken and a
higher key rate is targeted. Unfortunately, the phase an-
nouncement invalidates the existence of the photon num-
ber channel model [19], and, hence, no enhancement can
be claimed by directly applying the decoy-state method
onto the phase-encoding MDI-QKD scheme.
Here, in the phase-matching QKD scheme, we switch
from the qubit-based view to the optical-mode-based
view. As shown above, our proposed phase-matching
QKD follows the phase-encoding MDI-QKD scheme and
the TF-QKD scheme, by modifying the encoding and ba-
sis choice. The name “phase-matching (MDI-)QKD” fol-
lows “phase-encoding MDI-QKD”. We removed “MDI”
(which is not the key point to our work) to make the
name concise.
The PM-QKD protocol in the main text and Appendix
A is the one with d = 2 and random phase announce-
ment. Though the current practical implementations of
phase-encoding MDI-QKD / TF-QKD and PM-QKD do
resemble each other, the security scenarios are quite dif-
ferent. The TF-QKD can be taken as an extension of the
BB84 protocol, which utilizes the single-photon source
and is a discrete-variable QKD protocol. In the future,
many discrete-variable QKD design techniques, such as a
six-state protocol and reference-frame-independent pro-
tocol, can be employed in this framework. On the other
hand, in PM-QKD, we focus more on the optical modes
rather than single-photon states (qubits). It would be
interesting to see whether the security proof techniques
developed in continuous-variable QKD can be applied to
PM-QKD.
5. Recent related works on TF-QKD
There are some recent works based on TF-QKD.
Tamaki et al. provided a security proof of the TF-
QKD protocol [48]. They modified the TF-QKD protocol
by introducing a “test mode”, where Alice and Bob do
not announce the phase information and photon-number-
channel model holds. The original TF-QKD protocol
is called “code mode”. Following the original security
proof of phase-encoding MDI-QKD [17], they estimated
the phase error EX by considering the imbalance of dif-
ferent bases. With a fair sampling argument on the test
mode and the code mode, the basis imbalance in the
code mode can be estimated by the one in the test mode.
A square-root-scaling key rate has been derived, but it
is significantly lower than ours. Note that, there are
still two bases in Tamaki et al.’s protocol and security
proof, which follows the qubit-based view of BB84. The
two-basis requirement in the security proof implies that
it cannot be applied to our PM-QKD protocol directly,
which also highlights the difference between the phase-
encoding MDI-QKD / TF-QKD and PM-QKD.
Wang et al. proposed a “sending or not sending” TF-
QKD protocol [49], which aims to utilize the Z-basis of
single-photon for key generation, following the viewpoint
of TF-QKD. However, the definition of the Z-basis en-
coding seems confusing. In the original TF-QKD pro-
tocol, the definitions of the X or Y bases refer to the
ancillary bits rather than the real single photon. Also,
the Z-basis encoding on the real photon does not corre-
spond to a Z-basis encoding on the ancillary bits. This
protocol needs further studies.
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